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The Accidental Legal Historian:
Herman Melville and the History of
American Law
ALFRED S. KONEFSKYt
While Herman Melville has been variously described as
an existentialist, a socialist, Marxist, democrat, social
democrat, conservative, liberal, radical, reactionary, mod-
ernist, and postmodernist,' he has not to my knowledge
t University at Buffalo Distinguished Professor, School of Law, State
University of New York at Buffalo. First, I thank Joyce Farrell for her care and
patience with the manuscript and, in particular, her ability to convince
recalcitrant computer spell-check programs that the words Melville used
actually existed and were also really spelled that way. Second, I thank a
number of years of students in my Melville and the Law seminar for constantly
bringing fresh ideas to the course, a tribute both to them and Melville. Finally, I
thank a number of helpful and perceptive readers of the manuscript for their
assistance: James B. Atleson, Guyora Binder, Barry Cushman, David Engel,
Rebecca French, Robert Gordon, Frank Munger, Edward A. Purcell, Jr., John
Henry Schlegel, Avi Soifer, Robert Steinfeld, Chris Tomlins, G. Edward White,
Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., the participants in the University of Virginia Law School
Legal History Workshop, and especially Dianne Avery, for her interest,
thoroughness, and thoughtfulness. The usual disclaimer as to final
responsibility applies.
1. Since he is Melville, of course, he simultaneously fits all of these
descriptions and none of them. Elizabeth Hardwick has recently commented
that "so much about Melville is seems to be, may have been, and perhaps....
Melville's pages are the object of wild overinterpretation, even if it must be said
that his genius is of such peculiarity, such insistence, discursiveness-or
prolixity if the manner doesn't please-that it lends itself to flights of meaning."
ELIZABETH HARDWICK, HERMAN MELVILLE 141, 157 (2000). For example, "[a]
generation and more of contentious political readings hang like the smoke of
pitched battle over the contested text of Billy Budd; and the resulting murk is
of the greatest interest to anyone seeking to draw out the legal lessons that
Melville expected his readers to carry away from the story." Edwin M. Yoder,
Jr., Melville's Billy Budd and the Trials of Captain Vere, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1109, 1111 (2001). For an excellent example of how each generation may
rediscover Melville in its own image, see Geraldine Murphy, The Politics of
Reading Billy Budd, 1 AM. LITERARY HIST. 361 (1989) (tracking competing views
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been characterized as a legal historian. His work, however,
offers us a unique lens into his time-a way of under-
standing how law actually functioned to shape or constrain
social relations and to resolve moral dilemmas. Melville's
view of how law worked seems to contrast starkly with the
prevailing understanding offered by modern legal histori-
ans: that changing legal rules sustained an expansion of
liberty. He repeatedly drew portraits of an American cul-
ture in which hierarchy predominated, power and authority
were abused, and justice was compromised with terrible
consequences for American society and for individual
Americans. A world of free and independent actors was a
legally constructed world-a world Herman Melville appar-
ently did not believe actually existed. His fiction challenges
the claim of modern legal historians that freedom was ex-
panding in most facets of nineteenth-century American life.
Among other things, Melville reveals a sophisticated
understanding of the state of nineteenth-century American
law, often-because it is Melville-without explicitly or
directly talking about law. Melville was the quintessential
observer of the multiplicity of life's experiences, particularly
America's experiences. His genius lies in creating for each
of us as readers the capability of providing our own mean-
ing, our own interpretation, of what we are convinced he
wants us to see or comprehend. He is not quite resigned,
not quite optimistic, not quite agnostic about what he is
forcing us to confront. If he has a point, it seems to be,
advertently or inadvertently, consciously or unconsciously,
to make us uncomfortable, to make us face in our everyday
lives what we so often take for granted as individuals and
as a society.
This article explores three of Melville's short stories-
Benito Cereno, Bartleby, and Billy Budd-for evidence of his
views about the nature of law. By examining these stories, I
hope to demonstrate how Melville portrayed law as situated
in social relations. Measured against the template of the
modern legal historiography about the nineteenth century,
these three short stories offer new interpretations of the
trajectory of freedom in American law.
of the story through changes in mid-twentieth-century American politics). See
also GEORGE COTKIN, EXISTENTIAL AMERICA 17-19 (2003).
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MELVILLE AND AMERICAN LAW
I. MELVILLE, THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF LAW, AND MODERN
AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORIOGRAPHY
In just three paragraphs near the end of the first chap-
ter of Moby Dick, Ishmael's reflections on his own status
capture Melville's assumptions about the relationship
between law and society, assumptions that will become ap-
parent in Benito Cereno, Bartleby, and Billy Budd. Without
once mentioning law, Ishmael suggests the elements in
Melville's complex understanding of how law governs social
relationships, through a legally sanctioned and reinforced
regime of hierarchy, obedience, and dependence.
First, is the ubiquity of hierarchical relations, the ines-
capable pull of hierarchy, as well as its arbitrary deploy-
ment. Ishmael begins:
No, when I go to sea, I go as a simple sailor, right before the
mast, plumb down into the forecastle, aloft there to the royal mast-
head. True, they rather order me about some, and make me jump
from spar to spar, like a grasshopper in a May meadow. And at
first, this sort of thing is unpleasant enough. It touches one's sense
of honor, particularly if you come of an old established family in
the land, the Van Rensselaers, or Randolphs, or Hardicanutes.
And more than all, if just previous to putting your hand into the
tar-pot, you have been lording it as a country schoolmaster,
making the tallest boys stand in awe of you. The transition is a
keen one, I assure you, from a schoolmaster to a sailor, and
requires a strong decoction of Seneca and the Stoics to enable you
to grin and bear it. But even this wears off in time.
2
Melville is, of course, reflecting in some sense his own
autobiographical experiences. He is aware that he comes
from "an old established family," but his family is a strug-
gling, decaying, dying one, no longer on top, feeling the
strains and slights of lost status. He also remembers his
own school teaching experience, when he, though deprived
of social status, was able to resume a hierarchy, in "lording"
it over his young students. But the primary social observa-
tion is that hierarchy is pervasive, and that eventually
everyone grows accustomed to it.
Second, what follows from hierarchy, Melville then tells
us, seems to be dependence, a social culture of obedience
2. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK OR THE WHALE, in 6 THE WRITINGS OF
HERMAN MELVILLE: MOBY-DICK 3, 5-6 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds., 1988).
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and command. Those on top control those on the bottom.
Ishmael continues:
What of it, if some old hunks of a sea-captain orders me to get a
broom and sweep down the decks? What does that indignity
amount to, weighed, I mean, in the scales of the New Testament?
Do you think the archangel Gabriel thinks anything the less of me,
because I promptly and respectfully obey that old hunks in that
particular instance? Who aint a slave? Tell me that. Well, then,
however the old sea-captains may order me about-however they
may thump and punch me about, I have the satisfaction of
knowing that it is all right; that everybody else is one way or other
served in much the same way-either in a physical or
metaphysical point of view, that is; and so the universal thump is
passed around, and all hands should rub each other's shoulder-
blades, and be content.3
"Who aint a slave?" No matter how formally free we
may be, that is, even if we voluntarily enter into a social or
legal relationship, we are constrained by a convention of
obedience, which results in or reinforces deeply rooted de-
pendence. Ironically, "everybody else is in one way or other
served." Even those individuals who serve masters in
particular legal or social relationships have the opportunity
in other situations and relationships to command obedience
from subordinates. Thus, "the universal thump is passed
around," and, over time, everybody is both master and ser-
vant, in myriad shifting relationships of authority and
dependence.
Finally, in opposition to the reality of hierarchy, Mel-
ville poses the promise or aspiration of democratic equality.
Ishmael concludes:
I always go to sea as a sailor, because of the wholesome exercise
and pure air of the forecastle deck. For as in this world, head
winds are far more prevalent than winds from astern (that is, if
you never violate the Pythagorean maxim), so for the most part
the Commodore on the quarter-deck gets his atmosphere at second
hand from the sailors on the forecastle. He thinks he breathes it
first; but not so. In much the same way do the commonalty lead
their leaders in many 4other things, at the same time that the
leaders little suspect it.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Id. at 6-7.
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The officers believe they are first, but in reality the
common sailors breathe the head winds first. The sailors,
endowed with natural dignity and ability, in fact lead; the
officers follow. In the process of emphasizing the gap be-
tween apprehension and realty, Melville employs his
characteristic strategy of inversion, turning the world up-
side down. The world may bear witness to a formal
hierarchical organization, but it is in the face of a natural
assertion of equality.
So, for Melville, law's dominion takes place against the
backdrop of decaying aristocracies clinging to illegitimate
hierarchy through a socially constructed structure of
obedience. Law's function should be to level hierarchical
pretension and replace it, by fulfilling the promise of equal-
ity in which the most deserving-not the least deserving-
prosper. Privilege should be punctured; status should not
govern social relationships.
Law as the command of a sovereign requiring obedience
is, of course, an age-old problem of political theory. Melville
translates the question of political theory into a critique
about how legal rules writ large have an impact on social
relations that govern the vast array of everyday social in-
teractions-master/servant, master/slave, officer/sailor,
husband/wife, parent/child, landlord/tenant. Melville seems
uncomfortable with the fact that most ordinary people are
trapped for reasons of status into owing obedience to others,
even if the relationship was voluntarily assumed. Old atti-
tudes about hierarchy leading to dependence permeate
these relationships. Melville believes these attitudes distort
social relationships in a democracy.
Melville identified a problem that Blackstone, perhaps
influenced by Hobbes, addressed on the eve of the American
Revolution. Blackstone asserted, no doubt with an eye on
the increasingly recalcitrant American colonists, that "law
is that rule of action, which is prescribed by some superior,
and which the inferior is bound to obey."' For Blackstone, "a
law always supposes some superior who is to make it."6
Seeking to justify the source of law in civil society in order
5. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 38
(1765).
6. Id. at 43.
2004] 1183
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to distinguish it from a state of nature, Blackstone stressed
the obligation owed to superiors as a means of binding oth-
erwise unobligated individuals to a common good. The
American Revolution fundamentally changed that form of
fealty to obligation, as the locus of sovereignty shifted from
a monarchy to a republic.
James Wilson captured republican antipathy to Black-
stone in his law lectures immediately after the revolution
when he identified Blackstone's maxim about the superior's
prerogative to yrescribe law with despotism and the divine
right of kings. Wilson, focused on demolishing the preten-
sion of the command of the sovereign, did not disagree with
Blackstone's description of a general duty to obey the
dictates of law. Concerned with the shift in the theory of
political sovereignty from a monarch to the people, Wilson
now derived an obligation to obey law in a republic from the
freely entered consent of its citizens.
Now that the will of a superiour is discarded, as an improper
principle of obligation in human laws, it is natural to ask-What
principle shall be introduced in its place? In its place I introduce-
the consent of those whose obedience the law requires. This I
conceive to be the true origin of the obligation of human laws.8
Though the locus of sovereignty had shifted in society, the
obligation to obey the law or the commands of a recon-
stituted sovereign remained. If anything, obedience was
now doubly required because it emanated from the pre-
sumed private consent of the governed and was owed to the
people.
In Melville's view, the combination of hierarchy, com-
mand, and dependence formed a social system that did not
measure up to equality. The source of that combination
derived from law and its requirement of obedience. Rela-
tionships like master/servant, master/slave, master/sailor,
landlord/tenant, parent/child, husband/wife, were predi-
cated on the larger superstructure of the state's ability to
command obligation to its legal rules. The pattern of social
relationships replicated the wider political world at large,
7. See 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 103, 121 (Robert Green McCloskey
ed., 1967).
8. Id. at 121.
1184 [Vol. 52
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or to put it another way, the social relationships were "little
commonwealths," the state writ small.9
In that sense, Melville anticipated modern social
commentary that law may be interpreted "as a constitutive
societal force shaping social relations, constructing mean-
ing, and defining categories of behavior."10 Law is not just
about dispute resolution, or adjudication, or rights.
9. See JOHN DEMOS, A LITTLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH
COLONY (1970). See also EDMUND S. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION &
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND (rev. ed. 1966).
For the relationship between principles of political sovereignty and social
organization in the worlds of colonial and postrevolutionary America, compare
the following:
For the colonial period:
[Tihe colonists transplanted the monarchical household ruler onto New
World soil, albeit with certain modifications .... Much as monarchical
sovereignty could not be divided between a king and subject without
destroying kingship and the English constitution, so British Americans
painstakingly preserved an undivided baronial sovereignty within
families. In the eyes of the law, women could hope at best to function
not as coheads, possessed of their own sovereignty and lawmaking
authority, but as junior partners to whom men might grant limited
rights and privileges. Married women's primary obligations in the
polity lay not with political governors, but with domestic governors,
who made law for households.
SANDRA F. VANBURKLEO, "BELONGING TO THE WORLD": WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 18 (2001).
For the postrevolutionary era:
When American revolutionaries challenged laws governing the
relations between male subjects and the king, reconstituting men as
individuals free of patriarchal constraint, they left intact the system of
the old English law of domestic relations. This system of law was
among the many elements of English common law that were quietly
absorbed into American legal practice in order to save the trouble of
restating what seemed obvious. Some of this system was written into
statutes, some kept alive as unwritten precedent that courts respected
and could be counted upon to sustain.
Long before constitutions were constructed as new social contracts,
there were marriage contracts and the complex system of
subordination and authority which they were understood to embody.
LINDA K. KERBER, No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 11 (1998).
10. Paul Schiff Berman, Telling a Less Suspicious Story: Notes Toward a
Non-Skeptical Approach to Legal/Cultural Analysis, 13 YALE J. L. & HUM. 95,
97 (2001).
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A constitutive view of law sees legal discourse, categories, and
procedures as a framework through which individuals in society
come to apprehend reality. Thus, law is not merely a coercive force
operating externally to affect behavior and social relations; it is
also a lens through which we view the world and actually conduct
social relations .... [A] constitutive vision of law ... therefore...
treat[s] law as (1) a belief system that helps to define the roles of
individuals within society; (2) a system of organization that
determines societal roles; and (3) a language for conceptualizing
reality, mediating social relations, and defining behavior.
What Melville offers by explicating the relationships of
everyday life in painstaking detail, is a demonstration of
how "[I] aw is the art of composing society."
12
A clue to Melville's attitudes about law resides in his
views on the illegitimacy of hierarchy in a democratic soci-
ety pledged in theory to equality. "It is easy to forget that
the Founding Fathers envisioned nothing less than the
righting of all of the wrongs of old Europe, the establish-
ment of a new, citizen-centered order to replace the old one
that was hierarchy bound., 13 Melville scholars have noted
his "detestation of oppressive hierarchy." 4 In fact, he saw
hierarchy where others actually saw signs of equality, or
chose to ignore inequality. As America presumably aban-
doned and rejected earlier political and legal arrangements,
Melville was not sure he saw progress. As he grew older, he
became "a man disenchanted with the prevailing faith in
humanity's so-called progress, .. . who believed instead that
human nature is essentially the same from age to age,
regardless of superficial changes such as modern inventions
and other supposed improvements."" Melville seemed to
place changes in law in the category of "superficial change."
11. Id. at 109-10. Berman distills these ideas from his summary and critique
of the mainstream scholarship of the most recent generation of the law and
society movement, a generation heavily indebted to Clifford Geertz for its
inspiration.
12. Guyora Binder, The Poetics of the Pragmatic: What Literary Criticisms
of Law Offers Posner, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1511 (2001).
13. STANTON GARNER, THE CIVIL WAR WORLD OF HERMAN MELVILLE 26
(1993).
14. Barbara Foley, From Wall Street to Astor Place: Historicizing Melville's
Bartleby, 72 AM. LITERATURE 87, 107 (2000).
15. MERTON M. SEALTS, JR., BEYOND THE CLASSROOM: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN
AUTHORS 48-49 (1996).
1186 [Vol. 52
MELVILLE AND AMERICAN LAW
Like democracy, American law promised to eliminate hier-
archy and to provide equality. Instead, when Melville
looked carefully at the crucial institutions of law and soci-
ety, all he saw were relationships of dependency. The legal
forms may have changed but the content did not change.
Yet to appreciate more fully Melville's insights into
nineteenth-century American law, we need to take a detour
into modern legal historiography. Only then can we begin to
understand how contrarian was Melville's thought about
law and how much he may have to offer by way of a differ-
ent trajectory.
What if Melville's obsession with the corrosive effect of
hierarchy in a democracy were to force us to reconsider our
contemporary understanding of nineteenth-century Ameri-
can legal history? What if reading Melville's fictional
accounts, which frequently featured his perception of how
law functioned in his society, made us rethink our assump-
tions about how we have analyzed the legal institutions
with which he lived? Perhaps he has some insight to offer
as to how systems of hierarchy and dependence predomi-
nated in legal relations, despite both modern histo-
riographical depictions of evolution or progress and the
views of Melville's own contemporaries as to the beneficial,
transformative effects of law.
The argument over the shape of nineteenth-century
American law remains contested about issues of historical
methodology, causation, and evidence; impact, conse-
quences, and interpretation; and emphasis and signifi-
cance. 16 Yet most recent historians of nineteenth-century
16. Some of the leading examples of the prevailing paradigm of change
include: MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 (1977); JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN
THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON
MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975). These influential accounts were
written before the full impact of scholarship on republicanism and economic
liberalism found its way into legal historical studies. It is interesting, however,
to note that the standard explanation for nineteenth-century legal change has
nevertheless infiltrated into political and social history reflecting more recent
work on republicanism and liberalism, in effect becoming part of the
conventional wisdom. See, e.g., JOYCE APPLEBY, INHERITING THE REVOLUTION:
THE FIRST GENERATION OF AMERICANS 50-51, 55 (2000) (arguing that though
common law changes occurred they had little impact on the employment
relationship); ROBERT E. SHALHOPE, THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY: AMERICAN
2004] 1187
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American law, particularly antebellum law, have painted a
portrait of a legal system that evolved in an unfolding pat-
tern of expanding freedom and liberty. Tethered to the
political ideas of the American Revolution, legal doctrine, as
well as legal ideology, rejected prerevolutionary hierarchi-
cal relationships rooted in abandoned feudal practices and
reformed itself, for better or worse, in the image of both
republicanism and economic liberalism.
There have been significant challenges to assumptions
about whether market or premarket attitudes or behaviors
existed prior to the nineteenth century in colonial Amer-
ica.17 Some debate exists about whether "modern" markets
functioned in a premodern, precapitalist, pristine,
communitarian American idyll. It is probably more accurate
to say that markets were simply differently constituted.
Nevertheless, the expansion of economic and political free-
dom has been the most prominent explanatory theory, even
in the face of the considerable constraints on liberty
imposed on blacks, women, labor, and native Americans.
The modern trope of freedom asserts that legal rela-
tions in nineteenth-century America essentially were volun-
tary, that is, individuals or business organizations deciding
their own fate (a logical extension of self-government),
acting independently, all equal in the eyes of the law, and
free to act in their own self-interest. Within this model, con-
tractualism permeated most aspects of society. Indeed, the
most powerful evidence for this paradigm is drawn from the
world of private and public economic activity that incorpo-
rates the realms of contract and property relationships that
are assumed to govern most social relationships.18 There is
THOUGHT AND CULTURE, 1760-1800, at 119-25, 182 (1990) (citing Horwitz and
Nelson).
17. For challenges to the prevailing orthodoxy on timing and modernization,
see CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND
SOCIETY IN CONNECTICUT, 1639-1789 (1995); BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND
STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987). For a summary
of the outline of the historiographical dispute, see Claire Priest, Currency
Policies and Legal Development in Colonial New England, 110 YALE L.J. 1303,
1305-10 (2001).
18. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 16, at 31-62, 160-210. Horwitz, of course,
has not gone without his critics. See, e.g., A.W.B. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis
and the History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1979). There has been a
virtual cottage industry in Horwitz studies poring over nearly every claim in his
book-an industry too extensive to document here.
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a sense of the common weal but, increasingly over the
century, the public welfare or interest is defined as no more
than the aggregate of individuals deciding for themselves
how to better their own individual lot in the belief that
those decisions eventually will redound to the benefit of the
public good.' 9 And the public good is discounted for the fact
that any individual's expression of freedom in the market-
place might very well undermine or restrain someone else's
prior or contemporaneous entitlement to or assertion of
freedom, a kind of creative destruction.
The emerging system of private, autonomous legal rela-
tions gradually replaced what was assumed to be a pre-
dominantly paternalistic set of legal and social relations.
This primary English political model of sovereignty was
patterned after the king's or queen's theoretical relation-
ships to his/her subjects. The relationship of hierarchy and
dependence contained a series of reciprocal obligations
between the parties. Social relations in society were created
in the image of the dominant form of political organization.
"It was difficult for men and women of the premodern
world to conceive of equality. In the hierarchical structure
which sustained the social order, one human being was of
necessity almost always subject to another-child to parent,
servant to master, subject to ruler."2"
As Robert Steinfeld observed:
In the legal relationships of dependence (master and servant,
husband and wife, parent and child) of this period, the head of
household was responsible for the maintenance, care and
protection of all his dependents. They could bring a variety of legal
actions to enforce the duty of support which he owed them. But in
return, he was given, in varying degrees, legal jurisdiction or
control over them. This jurisdiction included rights to their
services, and even, in certain cases, rights to chastise or confine
19. For an argument asserting the dominance of a concept of a public
interest in law making as an expression of a well-regulated society in contrast
to an historiographic emphasis on private, autonomous activity, see WILLIAM J.
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA (1996). For an important view identifying an historical social
foundation and function of property rights in American law, see GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970 (1997).
20. LAUREL THATCHER ULRICH, GOOD WIVES: IMAGE AND REALITY IN THE LIVES
OF WOMEN IN NORTHERN NEW ENGLAND, 1650-1750, at 8 (1982).
2004] 1189
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them. The structure of these legal household relationships of
dependence closely resembled the structure of other relationships
of dependence common in this period. On the one hand, the law
imposed on heads of household duties to support and protect their
dependents. On the other hand, it extended to them varying
degrees of control over their persons and energies.
21
The form of these dependencies tended to permeate all
relationships in society from the voluntary to the involun-
tary: for example, town and pauper, landlord and tenant,
master and apprentice, master and slave.
The face of voluntarism was different, particularly
when interpreted against the backdrop of dependent rela-
tionships. Gordon Wood has noted:
Traditionally contracts did not mean what they were coming to
mean in the commercialized eighteenth century. In the past
contracts had often been used in patriarchal relationships-
between husbands and wives, masters and apprentices, or masters
and servants-and they were not thought to be incompatible with
hierarchy and inequality. These contracts were regarded as
evidence that the parties to the relationship, however unequal,
had mutual rights and obligations established in custom. Such
patriarchal contracts did not create these rights and obligations;
they merely recognized their existence. Often the contracts were
informal and not written out, as befitting their entanglement in
21. Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American
Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335, 344-45 (1989) (footnote omitted). An example of
the survival of these ideas in some quarters well into the nineteenth century
can be found in the proslavery views of Samuel F. B. Morse:
As Morse explained, the key to understanding slavery as an essential
feature of divine governance is The Fall. Man was created in the image
of God, partaking of the Divine Nature, but by his first Disobedience
assumed the image of Satan. To help restore man to his original state,
God arranged society as a "system of restraints" on man's proud will.
He instituted four relationships: civil government, marriage,
parenthood, and servility. Each relation consists of a superior and an
inferior party: ruler and ruled, husband and wife, parent and child,
master and slave. All four share "the one great central idea in Man's
Redemption, to wit, Obedience, the natural antidote to Disobedience."
The enslavement of blacks is no less legitimate or moral than
marriage, a system of divinely decreed educational and disciplinary
restraint: "God, in his wisdom and far-sighted benevolence, has
ordained that despised and vilified relation as the means of bringing
that race home to himself. This is the Bible theory."
KENNETH SILVERMAN, LIGHTNING MAN: THE ACCURSED LIFE OF SAMUEL F. B.
MORSE 399 (2003) (footnote omitted).
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the meshwork of society. The rights and obligations of the
contracts were not necessarily the result of deliberate acts of will,
nor did the parties even have to consent mutually to the contracts
for them to be binding. Such contacts defined relationships
between people rather than specific promises of action.
22
The traditional understanding on the eve of the Ameri-
can Revolution was perhaps best expressed by John Adams,
voicing both the dominant sense of reality and widespread
anxiety about impending change. In March of 1776, Abigail
Adams wrote to Adams that "she long[ed] to hear that you
have declared an independancy-and by the way in the new
Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to
make I desire you would Remember the Ladies .. .
Concerned with the "unlimited power" granted to husbands,
Abigail observed, "Remember all Men would be tyrants if
they could."24
John Adams had two sets of responses. One directly to
Abigail, though somewhat dismissive and sarcastic,
revealed the legal categories and social understanding
prominent in the discourse of the time:
As to your extraordinary Code of Laws, I cannot but laugh. We
have been told that our Struggle has loosened the bands of
Government every where. That Children and Apprentices were
disobedient-that schools and Colledges were grown turbulent-
that Indians slighted their Guardians and Negroes grew insolent
to their Masters. But your Letter was the first Intimation that
another Tribe more numerous and powerfull than all the rest were
grown discontented.-This is rather too coarse a Compliment but
you are so saucy, I won't blot it out.
Depend upon it. We know better than to repeal our Masculine
systems. Altho they are in full Force, you know they are little more
than Theory. We dare not exert our Power in its full Latitude. We
are obliged to go fair, and softly, and in Practice you know We are
the subjects. We have only the Name of Masters, and rather than
give up this, which would completely subject Us to the Despotism
of the Peticoat, I hope General Washington, and all our brave
Heroes would fight. I am sure every good Politician would plot, as
22. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 162
(1992).
23. Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (March 31, 1776), in 1 ADAMS
FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 369, 370 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1963).
24. Id.
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long as he would against Despotism, Empire, Monarchy,
Aristocracy, Oligarchy, or Ochlocracy.
Adams places together all those groups traditionally in
dependent legal categories-children, apprentices, stu-
dents, Indians, blacks as slaves or servants, women. The
world is organized that way, legally or socially. In the proc-
ess of answering Abigail, John was forced to confront the
fact that the hierarchy existed. He chose to deflect the
charge of tyranny (a charge leveled by the colonists against
the crown) by seeking to turn it around-"We [men] are the
subjects." In the process, he reveals that he sees the world
as master/subject writ large.
Adams's second response was to his friend James Sulli-
van, to whom he demonstrated that he took the implica-
tions of Abigail's ideas very seriously. The logical extension
of her thought would be that in a free republic those tradi-
tionally viewed as dependent might seek to vote, especially
as self-government might include within it the right of each
individual to be represented, or to give voice to their views.
Adams was concerned:
It is certain in Theory, that the only moral Foundation of
Government is the Consent of the People. But to what an Extent
Shall We carry this Principle? Shall We Say, that every Individual
of the Community, old and young, male and female, as well as rich
and poor, must consent, expressly to every Act of Legislation?...
Depend upon it, sir, it is dangerous to open so fruitfull a Source
of Controversy and Altercation; as would be opened by attempting
to alter the Qualifications of Voters. There will be no End of it.
New Claims will arise. Women will demand a Vote. Lads from 12
to 21 will think their Rights not enough attended to, and every
Man, who has not a Farthing, will demand an equal Voice with
any other in all Acts of State. It tends to confound and destroy all
Distinctions, and prostrate all Ranks, to one common Levell.26
Here then was the heart of the problem. Though
republican self-government replaced monarchy, though the
colonists would overthrow the dependent relationship of
25. Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams (April 14, 1776), in 1 ADAMS
FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 23, at 382.
26. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in 4 PAPERS
OF JOHN ADAMS 208, 208, 211-12 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1979).
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subject to king, there was danger in transforming the social
relationships upon which the foundation of the society
rested. In the eyes of men like Adams, the obligations or
rights in these relationships should not be altered, primar-
ily because the relationships themselves were not to
change. And if they did not change, that meant the vast
mass of people in dependencies and hierarchies could not be
sufficiently trusted to exercise their own will and judgment
because they were trapped into expressing the will of others
upon whom they were dependent. They could not be trusted
to govern because they represented somebody else's inter-
ests and not their own.
Gordon Wood and others have argued that the
American Revolution set in motion events, intellectual or
otherwise, that doomed John Adams's way of thinking, that
the ideas associated with the revolution were destined to
reform all of American society in its wake.
Women and children no doubt remained largely dependent on
their husbands and fathers, but the revolutionary attack on
patriarchal monarchy made all other dependencies in the society
suspect. Indeed, once the revolutionaries collapsed all the different
distinctions and dependencies of a monarchical society into either
freemen or slaves, white males found it increasingly impossible to
accept any dependent status whatsoever. Servitude of any sort
suddenly became anomalous and anachronistic.2 7
So the historical lesson generally seems to be that
dependent/hierarchical relations were gradually replaced by
free, equal relations in which independent legal actors
flourished by asserting their individual rights unrestrained
by abuses of authority and power. Melville, however,
seemed to believe either that legally dependent relation-
ships still dominated American life, or that the assertions of
individual freedoms provided a mask for a dependency
devoid of bonds of mutual obligation. In other words, indi-
vidual rights could be used to reinforce subordination.
In his 1852 novel Pierre, for instance, Melville paused
to describe the consequences of a world of dependent legal
and social relationships: the antirent agitations in the New
York of the 1840s.
27. WOOD, supra note 22, at 184.
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[C]onsider those most ancient and magnificent Dutch Manors at
the North, whose perches are miles-whose meadows overspread
adjacent counties-and whose haughty rent-deeds are held by
their thousand farmer tenants, so long as grass grows and water
runs; which hints of a surprising eternity for a deed, and seems to
make lawyer's ink unobliterable as the sea. Some of those manors
are two centuries old; and their present patroons or lords will
show you stakes and stones on their estates put there-the stones
at least-before Nell Gwynne the Duke-mother was born, and
genealogies which, like their own river, Hudson, flow somewhat
farther and straighter than the Serpentine brooklet in Hyde
Park ....
... But our lords, the Patroons, appeal not to the past, but they
point to the present. One will show you that the public census of a
county, is but part of the roll of his tenants. Ranges of mountains,
high as Ben Nevis or Snowdon, are their walls; and regular
armies, with staffs of officers, crossing rivers with artillery, and
marching through primeval woods, and threading vast rocky
defiles, have been sent out to distrain upon three thousand
farmer-tenants of one landlord, at a blow....
But whatever one may think of the existence of such mighty
lordships in the heart of a republic, and however we may wonder
at their thus surviving, like Indian mounds, the Revolutionary
flood; yet survive and exist they do, and are now owned by their
present proprietors, by as good nominal title as any peasant owns
28his father's old hat, or any duke his great-uncle's old coronet.
"Regular armies.., sent out to distrain upon...
farmer-tenants," and the spectre of "mighty lordships in the
heart of a republic" are not the measure of equality and
freedom. Distrained tenants are examples of citizens
victimized by hierarchies sanctioned by law, hierarchies
that suggest not progress but ancient and feudal decay.29 In
28. HERMAN MELVILLE, PIERRE OR THE AMBIGUITIES, in 7 THE WRITINGS OF
HERMAN MELVILLE 3, 10-11 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds., 1971).
29. Brook Thomas comments that the
allusion to the antirent movement in upstate New York draws
attention to the power that lawyer's ink has to hold citizens in almost
feudal bondage and the threat to social order that occurred when the
tenants disregarded the lawyer's contracts .... Melville's allusion to
the antirent movement is particularly telling, for it suggests that the
North is as capable as the South of using a legal code to maintain
oppressive social relations[,] ... a wage economy based on a legal
contract between employer and employee[,] ... a perfect example of
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the process of revealing this vision, Melville presents a
series of dilemmas, without necessarily suggesting how to
resolve them. Nevertheless, Melville places law and legal
institutions at the core of many of these moral dilemmas. In
explicating law's role, he offers his insights about how the
organizing ideas of legal culture functioned historically.
The question then remains: how do we assess Melville
as a legal historian? How would he have described his per-
spective? Was he looking backward? Or forward? Or was he
simply and realistically assessing the world around him? In
capturing, in fiction, discrete moments in nineteenth-
century history, was he describing a static world? If so, was
it such a dark and desultory world that it necessarily had
within it the seeds of its own destruction? Was Melville de-
scribing the end of an old set of legal relationships or
decrying the fact that they still existed and seemed power-
ful enough to perpetuate themselves far into the future? At
the very least, and from a safe and secure historical
distance, it is possible to say that Melville seemed skeptical
that America's aspirations and promises were being ful-
filled in political theory and law. He invited us to share his
skepticism. Perhaps, to employ a favorite Melville tech-
nique of role reversal, fiction is closer to truth. To begin to
appreciate Melville as an "accidental" legal historian, we
need to explore the text and context of his fiction.
This then is an essay about how law is embedded in lit-
erature. If you look carefully enough, you can find it as a
powerful motif. Just as law can be decoded to reveal wider
cultural meanings, so literature can be decoded to reveal
how America's democratic institutions did not bring about the
revolution hoped for by some and feared by others.
BROOK THOMAS, CROSS-EXAMINATIONS OF LAW AND LITERATURE: COOPER,
HAWTHORNE, STOWE, AND MELVILLE 146 (1987). Melville asked somewhat
rhetorically, "With no chartered aristocracy, and no law of entail, how can any
family in America imposingly perpetuate itself?" MELVILLE, PIERRE, supra note
28, at 8. Melville's questions are "suggestive of the discrepancy between
democratic ideals and political expediencies and the complicity between
governmental forces and the private financial interests of the upper class."
NANCY FREDRICKS, MELVILLE'S ART OF DEMOCRACY 110 (1995). For an
exceptional treatment of the complex legal and political events of the antirent
movement, see CHARLES W. MCCURDY, THE ANTI-RENT ERA IN NEW YORK LAW
AND POLITICS, 1839-1865 (2001). See also REEVE HUSTON, LAND AND FREEDOM:
RURAL SOCIETY, POPULAR PROTEST, AND PARTY POLITICS IN ANTEBELLUM NEW
YORK (2000).
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law.3" The primary examples of Melville's insights into
American law can be gleaned from three of his works,
Benito Cereno, Bartleby, and Billy Budd, as he examines
aspects of the legal relations of slavery, and capitalism, and




Published in 1855, Benito Cereno is set in the year
1799. Captain Amasa Delano, a New England sea captain,"command[s] a large sealer," which "lay at anchor" off the
coast of Chile. Delano is described as a "person of a singu-
larly undistrustful good nature, not liable, except on
extraordinary and repeated incentives, and hardly then, to
indulge in personal alarms, any way involving the imputa-
tion of malign evil in man." He has "a benevolent heart,"
but whether or not he has "more than ordinary quickness
and accuracy of intellectual perception, may be left to the
wise to determine" (47).
30. Along these lines, G. Edward White has recently written about
"interpretive techniques that might permit a closer and more faithful rendering
of the social and intellectual context in which [historical actors like John
Marshall] lived and worked." White believes that modem interpretive
techniques show particular promise. G. Edward White, Reassessing John
Marshall, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 673, 677 (2001) (book review). I am suggesting, of
course, that a "closer and more faithful rendering of the social and intellectual
context" of literature will in certain instances reveal or include law. For a
sophisticated analysis of modern legal historiographical approaches, see
William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal
History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065
(1997). I do not wish to embroil myself in literary criticism debates about
theory, meaning, context, and text, signifier and signified. I subscribe to what I
like to refer to as the Nike Theory of literary criticism (I realize this has
theoretical implications): "Just read it." For a useful examination of some of
these issues, see GUYORA BINDER & ROBERT WEISBERG, LITERARY CRITICISMS OF
LAW (2000). See also KIERAN DOLIN, FICTION AND THE LAW: LEGAL DISCOURSE IN
VICTORIAN AND MODERNIST LITERATURE 1-20 (1999).
31. All citations to passages from Benito Cereno are from HERMAN MELVILLE,
Benito Cereno, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF HERMAN MELVILLE: THE PIAZZA TALES AND
OTHER PROSE PIECES, 1839-1860, at 46 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds., 1987). The
page citations immediately follow the quotations in the body of the text itself.
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Delano's crew alerts him that "a strange sail was
coming into the bay.,., the stranger... showed no colors."
"Everything" is "gray"-" [t]he sky seemed a gray surtout,"
with "[filights of troubled gray fowl" and "troubled gray
vapors." And most ominously: "shadows present, foreshad-
owing deeper shadows to come" (46).
Delano decides to board the strange ship, bringing
provisions with him because he assumes the ship is in dis-
tress. He discovers the ship is a Spanish slaver. The ship
itself is in disarray, slaves and crew mixing and moving
unattended on board. The Spanish captain, Benito Cereno,
is described as passive, dreary, unhappy and spiritless. He
is attended by "a black of small stature" (51), Babo, who
follows him around the ship faithfully, seeming to attend to
all of Cereno's needs as Delano expects a slave would do.
At first Delano is convinced that the Spanish captain is
a potential threat to him and his ship. Delano invokes a
series of stereotypes about the slaves and the Spanish to
interpret a variety of strange events he witnesses on board.
The stereotypes serve to mask reality. What Delano has
come across is a ship that has been seized by a violent,
ruthless slave mutiny. The slaves are now in charge,
engaged in an elaborate charade to make it appear as if the
white crew is still in control. Delano does not figure out
what has transpired until he makes ready to return to his
vessel, when Benito Cereno jumps into Delano's whaleboat
to escape. Babo follows them both into the boat. Only then
does Delano experience "a flash of revelation," as the "scales
dropped from his eyes" (99). The slave is disarmed and the
three soon return to Delano's ship. Delano authorizes his
crew to return to Cereno's ship, to suppress and capture the
slaves, and to seize the ship. His men succeed after a bloody
fight.
Melville then reproduces Benito Cereno's deposition,
filed before the court in Peru designated to try Babo for the
mutiny and murders. The tribunal does not seek the
testimony of Babo and the surviving slaves. Babo is
convicted and executed, and "for many days, the head, that
hive of subtlety, fixed on a pole in the Plaza, met un-
abashed, the gaze of the whites. . ." (116). Benito Cereno-
demoralized, distraught, and drained from his experience-




It is tempting to try to establish the particular histori-
cal matters that may have influenced or prompted Melville
and to mine the sources for his inspiration. Some insightful,
very good work has been done by Robert Cover and Brook
Thomas, relating Melville's work generally to legal and
jurisprudential issues. But Melville, like Shakespeare, also
wrote about universal problems that engage us still.
Though historical context is useful (finding the spur, in a
way), it is not necessarily determinative of anything signifi-
cant. Still it helps to know, for example, that the Chief
Justice of Massachusetts, Lemuel Shaw, was Melville's
father-in-law and that Melville may have observed closely
as Shaw wrestled with issues involving slavery, the indus-
trial revolution, and the criminal law. For instance, Shaw
directly faced difficult problems concerning fugitive slaves
and, as an avowed antislavery advocate, experienced the
dilemma of enforcing laws that arguably ran counter to his
personal moral beliefs.
Melville's great gift resides, in part, in taking us beyond
the particular to the broader implications that historical
actors such as Shaw may not have seen, or for that matter,
that we ourselves may not discern at first.32 Melville may
have developed Shaw's experience into a more general
example of a societal and jurisprudential plight for Benito
Cereno. Nevertheless, Melville apparently derived Benito
Cereno from a particular source-a book by a real-life sea
captain named Amasa Delano published in Boston in 1817:
A Narrative of Voyages and Travels in the Northern and
Southern Hemispheres .... Chapter 18 of the book details
Delano's capture of the Spanish slave ship Tryal after a
slave mutiny had occurred. Melville made a significant
number of changes, symbolic and otherwise, to Delano's
account, including changing the name of the ship and the
date of the event.
32. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975); THOMAS, supra note 29. For Shaw, see generally
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW
(1957).
33. For an exhaustive list of the factual distinctions between Delano's story
and Melville's version, see LEA BERTANI VOZAR NEWMAN, A READER'S GUIDE TO
THE SHORT STORIES OF HERMAN MELVILLE 98-100 (1986). Scholars, of course,
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In changing the name of Benito Cereno's ship from the Tryal to
the San Dominick, Melville gave to Babo's slave revolt a specific
character that has often been identified. Haiti, known as San
Domingo (Saint-Domingue) before declaring its final independence
from France in 1804 and adopting a native name, remained a
strategic point of reference in debates over slavery in the United
States. In altering the date of Amasa Delano's encounter with
Benito Cereno from 1805 to 1799, moreover, Melville accentuated
the fact that his tale belonged to the Age of Revolution, in
particular the period of violent struggle leading to Haitian
independence presided over by the heroic black general Toussaint
L'Ouverture, which prompted Jefferson to remark in 1797 that
"the revolutionary storm, now sweeping the globe," shall, if
nothing prevents it, make us, "the murderers of our own
children."4
Though Delano's narrative may have been the proximate
source, it seems likely that Melville may have been
influenced in addition by a number of other historical
events, particularly the shipboard slave mutiny cases of the
Amistad and the Creole.
The legality and morality of the slave trade, and of
course the entire slave system that the trade supported,
were brought into stark relief by the events of the Amistad.
In 1839, a United States revenue cutter seized the Amistad,
a Spanish slave ship, off the coast of Long Island.35 The
American boarding party discovered a group of African
slaves, led by a charismatic leader, Cinque, in charge of the
ship. The slaves had seized control of the ship in a revolt
while it was being sailed from one Cuban port to another.
The mutiny resulted in the death of the ship's captain as
well as the slaves' owner. The rebellious slaves ordered the
surviving crew members to return the ship to Africa, but
the crew altered course at night to bring the ship closer to
American shores where they might be discovered and
have commented on the importance of the differences. See, e.g., Carolyn L.
Karcher, The Riddle of the Sphinx: Melville's Benito Cereno and the Amistad
Case, in CRITICAL ESSAYS ON HERMAN MELVILLE'S BENiTo CERENO 211-12 (Robert
E. Burkholder ed., 1992); 2 HERSHEL PARKER, HERMAN MELVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY,
1851-1891, at 235-42 (2002); SUSAN WEINER, LAW IN ART: MELVILLE'S MAJOR
FICTION AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN LAW 128-32 (1992).
34. ERIC J. SUNDQUIST, To WAKE THE NATIONS: RACE IN THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN LITERATURE 140 (1993).
35. For a thorough treatment of the events surrounding the voyage of the
Amistad, see HOWARD JONES, MUTINY ON THE AMISTAD (2d ed. 1997).
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rescued. The story seized the imagination of the American
public and was extensively covered by the popular press."
The fate of the Amistad mutineers was not deter-
mined until several years of litigation ensued involving
struggles between various Spanish and American private
and governmental interests. The Africans, imprisoned
during part of this period, contended for their freedom with
the assistance of American antislavery groups. Their law-
yers argued that the Spanish slave traders had captured
and enslaved them in defiance of Spanish law, which by
1839 had banned the slave trade. The Africans, therefore,
had simply freed themselves from the effects of an illegal
act. In an eloquent argument before the United States
Supreme Court, John Quincy Adams made the powerful
rhetorical point that
I know of no law,.., no law, statute or constitution, no code, no
treaty,. . . except that law (pointing to the copy of the Declaration
of Independence, hanging against one of the pillars of the court
room) that law, two copies of which are ever before the eyes of your
Honors. I know of no other law that reaches the case of my clients,
but the law of Nature and of Nature's God on which our fathers
placed our own national existence.
3 7
In directing the Supreme Court to what he thought the
source of its legal as well as moral authority to be, Adams
also reminded the justices that, in the not too distant past,
John Marshall had proclaimed in the Antelope case:
That [the slave trade was] contrary to the law of nature will
scarcely be denied. That every man has a natural right to the
fruits of his own labor, is generally admitted; and that no other
person can rightfully deprive him of those fruits, and appropriate
them against his will, seems to be the necessary result of this
admission. 38
36. For a comprehensive examination of the popular newspaper coverage of
the Amistad, see MAGGIE MONTESINOS SALE, THE SLUMBERING VOLCANO:
AMERICAN SLAVE SHIP REVOLTS AND THE PRODUCTION OF REBELLIOUS
MASCULINITY 66-96 (1997).
37. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, ARGUMENT OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1841), reprinted in ARGUMENT OF JOHN
QUINCY ADAMS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE CASE
OF THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS, VS. CINQUE AND OTHERS, AFRICANS,
CAPTURED IN THE SCHOONER AMISTAD, BY LIEUT. GEDNEY 8-9 (Negro Universities
Press 1969) (1841).
38. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825).
1200 [Vol. 52
MELVILLE AND AMERICAN LAW
Marshall, however, had concluded that if the positive law of
a nation authorized the slave trade, such natural law must
give way. In effect, then, the slave trading of any particular
country thus would be sanctioned by the law of nations.39
Adams spent a considerable portion of his Amistad
argument trying to demonstrate to the Court that the
reasoning in the Antelope case meant freedom for the
Africans. 0 In a narrowly crafted opinion by Justice Story,
the Supreme Court agreed. The Court rejected the Spanish
claim to the slaves as property, asserted under a treaty
with the United States; because the Africans were enslaved
illegally under Spanish law, they could not qualify as prop-
erty subject to protection under the treaty. Because positive
law did not recognize the Spanish claims, Story concluded
that "the eternal principles of justice" must govern.41
Because the Africans had been kidnapped, in other words,
they had the right to free themselves, to engage in a mu-
tiny. "We may lament," Story said, "the dreadful acts, by
which they asserted their liberty, and took possession of the
Amistad, and endeavoured to regain their native country;
but they cannot be deemed pirates or robbers in the sense of
the law of nations, or the treaty with Spain, or the laws of
Spain itself ...""
These events were reinforced in the immediate after-
math of the decision in The Amistad by the case of the
Creole in the fall of 1841. The Creole contained a cargo of
slaves being shipped from Virginia to New Orleans. Unlike
the Africans on board the Amistad, the slaves on the Creole
clearly were legally slaves under American law. Led by a
slave named Madison Washington, the slaves successfully
mounted a mutiny, killed a slave owner, and directed the
ship to Nassau in the Bahamas, where slavery had been
abolished. The United States tried to get the slaves
39. See id. at 122-23. For an excellent account of the Antelope case, see JOHN
T. NOONAN, JR., THE ANTELOPE: THE ORDEAL OF THE RECAPTURED AFRICANS IN
THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF JAMES MONROE AND JOHN QUINCY ADAMS (1977).
40. See ADAMS, supra note 37, at 123-34. For a discussion of Adams's roles in
the Antelope and Amistad cases, see Michael Daly Hawkins, John Quincy
Adams and the Antebellum Maritime Slave Trade: The Politics of Slavery and
the Slavery of Politics, 25 OKLA. CITYU. L. REV. 1 (2000).
41. United States v. The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Peters) 518, 595 (1841).
42. Id. at 593-94. See also COVER, supra note 32, at 105-12.
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returned to their owners, but the British officials refused.
In the face of a revolt on the high seas, under international
law the slave owners and crew were powerless to enforce
their "rights."43 Freedom governed, and both cases raised
fears in the South-a South living in fear of Gabriel
Prosser, Denmark Vesey, and Nat Turner-that revolt or
insurrection might become rampant. Melville took events
on board a slave ship and metaphorically transformed such
details to describe a broader society he thought ought to be
seriously questioning itself."
C. Law
Why didn't Captain Delano see or understand that a
mutiny had occurred on the slave ship? And what were the
perils in not recognizing that a revolt had taken place? The
answer surely lies in the fact that Delano, as well as many
Americans, was the prisoner of conventional racial
stereotypes that kept him from apprehending social reality
or the truth-in the case of Benito Cereno from grasping
that the slaves were in charge.4" Throughout the story,
Melville focuses our attention on this problem with a series
of metaphors describing slavery as the "slumbering
43. See generally WILLIAM E. CHANNING, THE DUTY OF THE FREE STATES, OR
REMARKS SUGGESTED BY THE CASE OF THE CREOLE (1842); SALE, supra note 36, at
120-45; 5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64, at 197-99 (1974).
44. See COVER, supra note 32, at 108. For the view that the Amistad events
influenced Melville's rendering of Benito Cereno, see Karcher, supra note 33;
MICHAEL PAUL ROGIN, SUBVERSIVE GENEALOGY: THE POLITICS AND ART OF
HERMAN MELVILLE 212-13 (1983); THOMAS, supra note 29, at 102-04. For
discussion of the influence of both the Amistad and Creole mutinies, see
SUNDQUIST, supra note 34, at 176-79. For examination of the incidence of slave
shipboard revolts, see Antonio T. Bly, Crossing the Lake of Fire: Slave
Resistance During the Middle Passage, 1720-1842, 83 J. Negro Hist. 178 (1998);
David Richardson, Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave
Trade, 58 WM. & MARY Q. 69 (2001). For an account of fears of slave
insurrections more generally, see Eugene D. Genovese, FROM REBELLION TO
REVOLUTION: AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVE REVOLTS IN THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
WORLD (1979).
45. For an evaluation of these stereotypes as well as critics' views of them,
see CAROLYN KARCHER, SHADOW OVER THE PROMISED LAND: SLAVERY, RACE AND
VIOLENCE IN MELVILLE'S AMERICA 129-42 (1980). See also SUSAN M. RYAN, THE
GRAMMAR OF GOOD INTENTIONS: RACE AND THE ANTEBELLUM CULTURE OF
BENEVOLENCE 69-74 (2003); SUNDQUIST, supra note 34, at 152-54.
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volcano," which might "suddenly let loose energies now hid"
(68). Or as padlock and key: "The slave there carries the
padlock, but master here carries the key" (63). (Of course in
the context of the story, this was literally not true, but also
not recognized by Delano as being untrue since normally it
is the master who holds the key to freedom.) Or as a
Gordian knot: " 'What are you knotting there, my man?'
'The knot,' was the brief reply, without looking up. 'So it
seems; but what is it for?' 'For someone else to undo'...
'Undo it, cut it, quick' " (76). (In the heart of the story, this
has a double meaning of trying to get Delano to cut the knot
to see that the mutiny has taken place, but also in a larger
sense suggesting that the knot of slavery both needs to be
recognized as the intricate "entanglement" of American life
and that it needs to be cut to release freedom.) Or as simply
the "shadow" (116) cast across the bright promise of
America. At the end of the story, when the ever-optimistic
American, Delano, pleads with Captain Cereno to abandon
his despair after experiencing the horror of the mutiny,
Delano implores Benito Cereno: " 'You are saved,' cried
Captain Delano, more and more astonished and pained;
'you are saved: what has cast such a shadow upon you?'
Cereno simply responded, 'The negro' " (116). Until the
United States resolved the question of freedom, Melville
seems to suggest, slavery would perpetually cast a shadow. 6
Melville clearly was an antislavery advocate. "Those of
us who always abhorred slavery as an atheistical iniquity,
gladly we join in the exulting chorus of humanity over its
downfall."' Even discounting for patriotic pro-Union Civil
War fervor, Melville believed that slavery inevitably
compromises any meaningful notion of freedom. This of
course, does not necessarily mean he was an abolitionist or
that he did not employ in his work the conventional racist
stereotypes of his time. But Melville, like Thomas Jefferson
(who did harbor racist sentiments), seems to have under-
46. See generally KARCHER, supra note 45. Delano's "refusal to understand
the 'shadow' that has descended upon Benito Cereno is itself a psychologically
and politically repressive act that replicates the ideology of America's crisis over
slavery." SUNDQUIST, supra note 34, at 149.
47. THE BATTLE-PIECES OF HERMAN MELVILLE 200 (Hennig Cohen ed., 1963).
48. See KARCHER, supra note 45, at 15-18.
2004] 1203
1204 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
stood slavery as a profound social problem. Jefferson per-
ceptively observed:
There must doubtless be an unhappy influence on the manners
of our people produced by the existence of slavery among us. The
whole commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise
of the most boisterous passions, the most unremitting despotism
on the one part, and degrading submissions on the other. Our
children see this, and learn to imitate it; for man is an imitative
animal.... The parent storms, the child looks on, catches the
lineaments of wrath, puts on the same airs in the circle of smaller
slaves, gives a loose to the worst of passions, and thus nursed,
educated, and daily exercised in tyranny, cannot but be stamped
by it with odious peculiarities. The man must be a prodigy who can
retain his manners and morals undepraved by such
circumstances.4 9
The stereotypes that particularly restrict Delano's
vision grow out of the social effects associated with slavery.
Those social relations, one could argue, likewise proceed
from a series of consequences determined by law. In other
words, legal relations are social relations 0 The legal regime
of control sets up the parameters within which a social field
of control flourishes. A slave who bargains or negotiates for
a small plot to tend a garden, for the opportunity to earn
wages, or for time off for himself or his family is bargaining
in a world infused with law. 1 There were limits, possibili-
49. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 162 (William
Peden ed., 1955) (footnote omitted).
50. See the essays in Part Three-Rules of Law: Legal Relations as Social
Relations, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA 215-332 (Christopher L.
Tomlins & Bruce H. Mann eds., 2001).
51. There is a considerable literature across a number of ideological
perspectives devoted to asserting that market relations or various forms of
bargaining were inserted into social, economic, and legal relationships
traditionally directly associated with power and exploitation, thereby leveling
the playing field in some manner. For example, in landlord-tenant relations, see
SUNG BOK KIM, LANDLORD AND TENANT IN COLONIAL NEW YORK: MANORIAL
SOCIETY, 1664-1775 (1978). For slavery, see IRA BERLIN, MANY THOUSANDS
GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 2 (1998)
("[Silavery, though imposed and maintained by violence, was a negotiated
relationship."); Ira Berlin & Philip D. Morgan, Labor and the Shaping of Slave
Life in the Americas, in CULTIVATION AND CULTURE: LABOR AND THE SHAPING OF
SLAVE LIFE IN THE AMERICAS 1 (Ira Berlin & Philip D. Morgan eds., 1993). For
indentured servitude, see Alexa Silver Cawley, A Passionate Affair: The Master-
Servant Relationship in Seventeenth-Century Maryland, 61 HISTORIAN 751, 752
(1999) ("As recent studies of slavery have shown that slaves were able to carve
out a certain degree of autonomy in their relationships with their masters,
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ties and opportunities, and perhaps the recognition of
market power and a rational appeal to an owner's economic
self-interest. The social practices allow a master to relin-
quish some of the perogatives of power bestowed by law in
the master-slave relationship. But the escape of a runaway
slave, a slave shipboard mutiny, or a slave revolt or insur-
rection, is simultaneously an escape from a master and an
escape from law.
Delano repeatedly seems incapable of understanding
that the slaves have seized their freedom. Everywhere he
looks he finds reaffirmation of his view of the world. As
designated by law, slaves are subservient; owners are in
charge and free to exercise power and control. It is
Jefferson's world. The stereotypes that encumber Delano's
vision are variations linked directly to hierarchy and
dependence. 2
As Delano boards the ship, he is "at once surrounded by
a clamorous throng of whites and blacks, but the latter out-
numbering the former more than could have been
expected.. ." (49). He soon observes "four elderly grizzled
negroes... couched sphynx-like... picking... oakum" and
"six other blacks" polishing hatchets, "intent upon their
task... with the peculiar love in negroes of uniting indus-
try with pastime" (50). Perhaps this scene "might have
seemed unusual" (50), slaves mingled with whites on deck,
not chained or manacled as might have been the custom,
working on hatchets, which are possible weapons. But
Delano instead assumes that the slaves are under the con-
trol and supervision of the owners, crew, or traders, and
that nothing was amiss.
His initial reaction is immediately reinforced by his
first confrontation with Benito Cereno and Babo, the slave
turned mutineer. Without any alarm yet, Delano seeks the
ship's commander. He finds the Spanish captain "casting a
indentured servants also negotiated with their masters to improve their
position in colonial society using a variety of methods available to them.");
Christine Daniels, "Liberty to Complaine:" Servant Petitions in Maryland, 1652-
1797, in THE MANY LEGALITIES OF EARLY AMERICA, supra note 50, at 219-49.
52. "Delano is the representative American of a position traditionalist in its
support of patriarchal structures, not excluding their racist forms ......
BERNHARD RADLOFF, COSMOPOLIS AND TRUTH: MELVILLE'S CRITIQUE OF
MODERNITY 184 (1996). On Delano and American national character, see also 2
PARKER, supra note 33, at 237-38.
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dreary, spiritless look" upon the slaves, and "an unhappy
glance" toward Delano (51). Yet Delano seems placated by
the fact that "[b]y his side stood a black of small stature, in
whose rude face, as occasionally, like a shepherd's dog, he
mutely turned it up into the Spaniard's, sorrow and affec-
tion were equally blended" (51). Babo thus gives off signs of
loyalty and obedience, looking up like a dog gazing at the
dominant partner. Babo, in other words, knows what to
expect of Delano's view of the world, indeed, he repeatedly
plays and counts on it. 3
Two problems perturb Delano, however. The lack of
general order on the ship is traceable, first, to the harrow-
ing circumstances of disease and death, described in the
shipboard account by black and white survivors alike, and,
second, to the quirks of the Spanish captain's personality.
Delano observes that the "scarcity of water and provisions,"
for example, "have brought out the less good-natured quali-
ties of the negroes, besides, at the same time, impairing the
Spaniard's authority over them. . . ." (51). "[N]othing more
relaxes good order than misery" (51-52), but the exercise of
authority should be taken for granted Delano insists. As for
Benito Cereno himself, "Captain Delano was not without
the idea, that had [Cereno] been a man of greater energy,
misrule would hardly have come to the present pass" (52).
Delano finds Cereno suffering from a "debility," he is "a
prey to settled dejection," "unstrung," afflicted with a
"distempered spirit" and "with nervous suffering" (52).
Cereno is almost literally supported by his slave, Babo,
who, of course, will not leave Benito's side. But Babo also
knows that Delano expects Babo to act the role of the faith-
ful slave, and he does so.
53.
The master's domination slides into slavery when he understands his
parasitic dependence on his slave; the slave's subservience slides into
mastery when he understands that his very consciousness of freedom
is a mode of liberation.... Granting Babo a true mastery that has
simply been reconfigured as the artifice of bondage, however, Melville
takes this one step further. Babo's power .. . is exercised less in the
violence of revolt ... than in his uncanny manipulation of the revolt's
linguistic and visual narrative .... In Babo's case it takes the form of
a masquerade that humiliates the masters ....
SUNDQUIST, supra note 34, at 156 (emphasis in original).
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No wonder that, as in this state he tottered about, his private
servant apprehensively followed him. Sometimes the negro gave
his master his arm, or took his handkerchief out of his pocket for
him; performing these and similar offices with that affectionate
zeal which transmutes into something filial or fraternal acts in
themselves, but menial; and which has gained for the negro the
repute of making the most pleasing body servant in the world; one,
too, whom a master need be on no stiffly superior terms with, but
may treat with familiar trust; less a servant than a devoted
companion.
Marking the noisy indocility of the blacks in general, as well as
what seemed the sullen inefficiency of the whites, it was not
without humane satisfaction that Captain Delano witnessed the
steady good conduct of Babo (52).
Babo understands that Delano expects obedience even if
Benito cannot command it. The form of the relationship is
enough to dictate behavior that Delano will construe as
reassuring and nonthreatening.
Though Delano is bothered by the way in which Benito
exercises power, Delano insists that he is not misled by the
results:
This splenetic disrelish of [Cereno's] place was evinced in almost
every function pertaining to it. Proud as he was moody, he
condescended to no personal mandate. Whatever special orders
were necessary, their delivery was delegated to his body-servant,
who in turn transferred them to their ultimate destination,
through runners, alert Spanish boys or slave boys, like pages or
pilot-fish within easy call continually hovering round Don Benito.
So that to have beheld this undemonstrative invalid gliding about,
apathetic and mute, no landsman could have dreamed that in him
was lodged a dictatorship beyond which, while at sea, there was no
earthly appeal (53).
He had only the "appearance of slumbering dominion" (54).
Cereno seems aware that Delano may be suspicious. He
tries to quiet whatever fears may have arisen by relying on
a picture he paints of complacent, compliant slaves who
know their place in the hierarchy.
"But throughout these calamities," huskily continued Don
Benito, painfully turning in the half embrace of his servant, "I
have to thank those negroes you see, who, though to your
inexperienced eyes appearing unruly, have, indeed, conducted
themselves with less of restlessness than even their owner could
have thought possible under such circumstances."
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Here he again fell faintly back. Again his mind wandered: but he
rallied, and less obscurely proceeded.
"Yes, their owner was quite right in assuring me that no fetters
would be needed with his blacks; so that while, as is wont in this
transportation, those negroes have always remained upon deck-
not thrust below, as in the Guinea-men-they have, also, from the
beginning, been freely permitted to range within given bounds at
their pleasure" (56-57).
Babo, according to Benito, has been instrumental in
maintaining order.
"Ah, master," sighed the black, bowing his face, "don't speak of
me; Babo is nothing; what Babo has done was but duty."
"Faithful fellow!" cried Capt. Delano. "Don Benito, I envy you
such a friend; slave I cannot call him."
As master and man stood before him, the black upholding the
white, Captain Delano could not but bethink him of the beauty of
that relationship which could present such a spectacle of fidelity
on the one hand and confidence on the other (57).
The social relationship, therefore, is drawn out of the
legal relationship. The slave "upholds" the master in
multiple meanings including providing the work that
creates the wealth at the foundation of the slave society.
Fidelity, loyalty, obligation, and obedience are hallmarks of
a relationship of domination, not reciprocity. Delano
mistakes it for beauty.
"Ha, Don Benito, your black here seems high in your trust; a
sort of privy-counselor, in fact."
Upon this, the servant looked up with a good-natured grin, but
the master started as from a venomous bite. It was a moment or
two before the Spaniard sufficiently recovered himself to reply;
which he did, at last, with cold constraint:- "Yes, Senor, I have
trust in Babo."
Here Babo, changing his previous grin of mere animal humor
into an intelligent smile, not ungratefully eyed his master (67).
54.
By forcing Don Benito to play the part of master, Babo has forced him
to mistrust the patriarchal, domestic relations which had constituted
his identity. By overthrowing slavery and then staging it as a play,
Babo has conventionalized the supposedly natural relations of master
and slave. He has turned familial intimacy from a stable barrier
against marketplace fluctuations into a confidence game. Benito Cereno
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When Delano witnesses what he thinks is an act of
insubordination on board (a slave attacking a white), he
finds it incomprehensible that Benito seems reluctant to
enforce discipline. It is his right as a ship's captain (not
unlike a master with his slave). Delano critically observes:
"Is it... that this hapless man is one of those paper
captains I've known, who by policy wink at what by power
they cannot put down? I know no sadder sight than a com-
mander who has little of command but the name" (59).
Power or dominion over others is a fact of everyday life, but
it is useless or worse if not exercised.
In order to play out the full "charade," Babo enlists his
slave co-conspirator, Atufal, to help create the impression
that the captain in reality is in command. Babo has Atufal
placed in chains and paraded before Delano to give him
evidence of what he expects to find in a slave's conduct. "An
iron collar was about his neck, from which depended a
chain, thrice wound round his body; the terminating links
padlocked together at a broad band of iron, his girdle" (61).
As Babo expects, Delano falls for the ruse.
This is some mulish mutineer, thought Captain Delano,
surveying, not without a mixture of admiration, the colossal form
of the Negro.
"See, he waits your question, master," said the servant.
Thus reminded, Don Benito, nervously averting his glance, as if
shunning, by anticipation, some rebellious response, in a
disconcerted voice, thus spoke:-
"Atufal, will you ask my pardon, now?"
The black was silent.
suggests that instead of protecting the master's self, domestic
patriarchy opens his boundaries to invasion ....
[Don Benito] is a marionette, manipulated by his slave. The captain is
forced to speak the lines that once seemed his by nature. Babo tortures
him with an exaggerated fidelity that mocks the paternalism of master
and slave ....
Against an ideology that saw slavery as the most organic of social
relations, Melville conventionalized, as stage props, the symbols of
authority which slaveowners insisted were theirs by nature ....
ROGIN, supra note 44, at 215, 216.
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"Again, master," murmured the servant, with bitter upbraiding
eyeing his countryman, "Again, master; he will bend to master
yet."
"Answer," said Don Benito, still averting his glance, "say but the
one word pardon, and your chains shall be off."
Upon this, the black, slowly raising both arms, let them
lifelessly fall, his links clanking, his head bowed; as much as to
say, "no, I am content."
"Go," said Don Benito, with inkept and unknown emotion.
Deliberately as he had come, the black obeyed.
"Excuse me, Don Benito," said Captain Delano, "but this scene
surprises me; what means it, pray?"
"It means that that negro alone, of all the band, has given me
peculiar cause of offense, I have put him in chains; I-"
Here he paused, his hand to his head, as if there were a
swimming there, or a sudden bewilderment of memory had come
over him; but meeting his servant's kindly glance seemed
reassured, and proceeded:-
"I could not scourge such a form. But I told him he must ask my
pardon. As yet he has not. At my command, every two hours he
stands before me."
"And how long has this been?"
"Some sixty days."
"And obedient in all else? And respectful?"
"Yes" (62).
Delano is satisfied as long as the forms of slavery are
vindicated.
Indeed, at one point Delano is so engaged by the placid
operation of slavery that he seeks to participate in it
personally by smilingly offering to buy Babo from Benito.
Moved by Babo's attentions to Benito, Delano
[c]ould not avoid again congratulating his host upon possessing
such a servant, who, though perhaps a little too forward now and
then, must upon the whole be invaluable to one in the invalid's
situation.
"Tell me, Don Benito," he added, with a smile-"I should like to
have your man here, myself-what will you take for him? Would
fifty doubloons be any object?"
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"Master wouldn't part with Babo for a thousand doubloons,"
murmured the black, overhearing the offer, and taking it in
earnest, and, with the strange vanity of a faithful slave,
appreciated by his master, scorning to hear so paltry a valuation
put upon him by a stranger (70-71).
Far from questioning the morality of slavery, Delano views
it as natural enough so that he flirts with participating in it
without grasping that it might compromise his own soul. To
tolerate slavery means to risk becoming intensely complicit
in it.
As a northerner, Delano may not have been unfamiliar
at all with the operation of the institution of slavery.
Moreover, in 1799 when Melville dated the story, slavery
was still commonplace in many postrevolutionary northern
states, so it is not necessarily surprising that Delano might
be tempted himself to traffic in the trade.55 Delano is
comfortable, perhaps even complacent, readily accepting
slavery as one of the basic indicia of everyday life, because
he shares stereotypical assumptions about the appropriate
roles and abilities dictated by the social relationship.56
Delano surmises,
55. Ira Berlin notes:
[T]he demise of slavery was a slow, tortuous process. Often it was
propelled more by atrophy of the slave population-owing to high
mortality, low fertility, the close of the transatlantic slave trade, and
the southward exportation of slaves for profit-than by the growth of
liberty among blacks. In 1810 there were still 27,000 slaves in "free"
states. For most northern slaves, more than a generation passed before
they were able to exit chattel bondage, and more than two generations
were required to extricate themselves from the various snares-legal,
extralegal, and occasionally illegal-that allowed former owners and
other white people to control their labor and their lives.
BERLIN, supra note 51, at 228. See also GRAHAM RUSSELL HODGES, SLAVERY AND
FREEDOM IN THE RURAL NORTH: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN MONMOUTH COUNTY, NEW
JERSEY, 1665-1865 (1997); JOANNE POPE MELISH, DISOWNING SLAVERY: GRADUAL
EMANCIPATION AND "RACE" IN NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1860 (1998); GARY B. NASH &
JEAN R. SODERLUND, FREEDOM BY DEGREES: EMANCIPATION IN PENNSYLVANIA AND
ITS AFTERMATH (1991); SHANE WHITE, SOMEWHAT MORE INDEPENDENT: THE END
OF SLAVERY IN NEW YORK CITY, 1770-1810 (1991).
56. Brook Thomas comments that "Captain Delano, a good, honest man
serving on a merchant ship, aids-unconsciously, I do not doubt-in the
exploitation of human beings for commercial reasons, thereby helping to make
the new democracy of the United States, as exploitative as the feudal system it
replaced." THOMAS, supra note 29, at 109.
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Was it from foreseeing some possible interference like this, that
Don Benito had, beforehand, given such a bad character of his
sailors, while praising the negroes; though, indeed, the former
seemed as docile as the latter the contrary? The whites, too, by na-
ture, were the shrewder race .... But if the whites had dark
secrets concerning Don Benito, could then Don Benito be any way
in complicity with the blacks? But they were too stupid (75).
Delano employs the full range of attitudes about the
social status of slaves or servants.
There is something in the negro which, in a peculiar way, fits
him for avocations about one's person. Most negroes are natural
valets and hair-dressers; taking to the comb and brush congenially
as to the castinets, and flourishing them apparently with almost
equal satisfaction. There is, too, a smooth tact about them in this
employment, with a marvelous, noiseless, gliding briskness, not
ungraceful in its way, singularly pleasing to behold, and still more
so to be the manipulated subject of. And above all is the great gift
of good humor. Not the mere grin or laugh is here meant. Those
were unsuitable. But a certain easy cheerfulness, harmonious in
every glance and gesture; as though God had set the whole negro
to some pleasant tune.
When to all this is added the docility arising from the
unaspiring contentment of a limited mind, and that susceptibility
of blind attachment sometimes inhering in indisputable inferiors,
one readily perceives why those hypochondriacs, Johnson and
Byron-it may be, something like the hypochondriac, Benito
Cereno-took to their hearts, almost to the exclusion of the entire
white race, their serving men, the negroes, Barber and Fletcher
(83-84).
"Docility" by slaves is presumed to follow from a realistic
conditioning to an inferior social position or place in society.
It stems from subordination.
Delano's restricted ability to discern who actually is in
charge causes him to misapprehend reality in the most
compelling moment in the story, the famous shaving scene.
Babo shaves Benito:
Setting down his basin, the negro searched among the razors, as
for the sharpest, and having found it, gave it an additional edge by
expertly strapping it on the firm, smooth, oily skin of his open
palm; he then made a gesture as if to begin, but midway stood
suspended for an instant, one hand elevating the razor, the other
professionally dabbling among the bubbling suds on the Spaniard's
lank neck. Not unaffected by the close sight of the gleaming steel,
Don Benito nervously shuddered; his usual ghastliness was
heightened by the lather, which lather, again, was intensified in
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its hue by the contrasting sootiness of the negro's body. Altogether
the scene was somewhat peculiar, at least to Captain Delano, nor,
as he saw the two thus postured, could he resist the vagary, that
in the black he saw a headsman, and in the white a man at the
block. But this was one of those antic conceits, appearing and
vanishing in a breath, from which, perhaps, the best regulated
mind is not always free.
"You must not shake so, master.-See, Don Amasa, master
always shakes when I shave him. And yet master knows I never
yet have drawn blood, though it's true, if master will shake so, I
may some of these times. Now master," he continued. "And now,
Don Amasa, please go on with your talk about the gale, and all
that, master can hear, and between times master can answer."
Here an involuntary expression came over the Spaniard, similar
to that just before on the deck, and whether it was the start he
gave, or a sudden gawky roll of the hull in the calm, or a
momentary unsteadiness of the servant's hand, however it was,
just then the razor drew blood, spots of which stained the creamy
lather under the throat; immediately the black barber drew back
his steel, and, remaining in his professional attitude, back to
Captain Delano, and face to Don Benito, held up the trickling
razor, saying, with a sort of half humorous sorrow, "See, master-
you shook so-here's Babo's first blood."
No sword drawn before James the First of England, no
assassination in that timid King's presence, could have produced a
more terrified aspect than was now presented by Don Benito.
Poor fellow, thought Captain Delano, so nervous he can't even
bear the sight of barber's blood; and this unstrung, sick man, is it
credible that I should have imagined he meant to spill all my
blood, who can't endure the sight of one little drop of his own?
Surely, Amasa Delano, you have been beside yourself this day. Tell
it not when you get home, sappy Amasa. Well, well, he looks like a
murderer, doesn't he? More like as if himself were to be done for.
Well, well, this day's experience shall be a good lesson (84-86).
The world has been turned upside down. Hierarchy has
been reversed, but Delano cannot see it.57 Just to emphasize
57. Former slaves completely understood the concept of role reversal.
During the Civil War, "[b]lack troops flaunted their contempt for symbols of
bondage, and relished the opportunity to exert authority over Southern
whites. ... [One soldier] recognizing his former master among a group of
military prisoners, exclaimed: 'Hello massa: bottom rail top distime!' " ERIC
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his dominion, Babo cuts Cereno in order to remind him who
is in charge lest Benito be tempted to tip off Delano. The
thought that the slave might be in control (literally with the
razor at the neck of the white master) occurs to Delano, but
he quickly represses the image." It is simply unthinkable to
him.
Babo capitalizes on Delano's inability to puzzle out the
real story, and cements it by cleverly nicking himself to
indicate that he is bleeding because Benito has punished
him for the negligent shaving job.
"Ah, when will master get better from his sickness; only the sour
heart that sour sickness breeds made him serve Babo so; cutting
Babo with the razor, because, only by accident, Babo had given
master one little scratch; and for the first time in so many a day,
too. Ah, ah, ah," holding his hand to his face.
Is it possible, thought Captain Delano; was it to wreak in
private his Spanish spite against this poor friend of his, that Don
Benito, by his sullen manner, impelled me to withdraw? Ah, this
slavery breeds ugly passions in man. -Poor fellow! (88).
With deep irony, Melville has it that Delano ruminates
about how "slavery breeds ugly passions." But he does not
question it. Babo has restored the ordinary contours of the
relationship with one nick of the razor creating the impres-
sion that he has been cruelly punished by his master-an
act that Delano can fully comprehend. Power, control,
domination have been revived. The legal dominion of mas-
ter over slave has been resumed; the threat of a slave
wielding a razor at the neck of a white man, figuratively or
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 9
(1988).
58.
The "antic conceit" of decapitation-uniting Jacobin terror, the
Inquisition, and slave vengeance-has more actuality here than the
literal barbering that is taking place. To begin with, it exposes the
rebellious potential within every slave. As Thomas Wentworth
Higginson said in an 1858 address to the American Anti-Slavery
Society: "I have wondered in times past, when I have been so weak-
minded as to submit my chin to the razor of a coloured brother, as
sharp steel grazed my skin, at the patience of the Negro shaving the
white man for many years, yet [keeping] the razor outside of the
throat." The American slave might soon act on his own, Higginson
warned. "We forget the heroes of San Domingo."
SUNDQUIST, supra note 34, at 159.
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literally, has been eliminated.59 Comprehensible order
reigns again.
Yet there is a warning, unrecognized by Delano,
because it is cleverly concealed by Babo. Society is at con-
siderable risk if it insists on maintaining slavery as a legal
relationship. The inevitable attempt to end the domination
inherent in slavery is likely to be violent and bloody.
Melville suggests it is time to think about the problem, be-
cause the consequences of continuing this way of life are
simply not acceptable.
The legal system seems as incapable as any other social
institution of coping with the problem of slavery. Babo is
ultimately tried and convicted of murder and mutiny. It
may be law, but is it justice? The legal system formally
intrudes when part of Benito Cereno's deposition is repro-
duced at the end of the story. His testimony will obviously
play an important role in leading to Babo's conviction, and
he tells a terrifying and bloody tale of mayhem, murder,
and violence. There are at least three reasons for Melville to
have appended the deposition, though it seems awkward to
have done so.
First, he is perhaps suggesting that the horrific tale will
be repeated unless the world of domination expressed by
slavery is remedied. In that sense, Benito Cereno is a
cautionary tale. There are other Babos out there who know
the meaning of bondage and freedom, and are prepared to
act on it.
Second, Melville tells us that "[s]ome disclosures" in the
deposition "were, at the time, held dubious for both learned
and natural reasons. The tribunal inclined to the opinion
59.
Both the law of slavery and the proslavery ideology on which it was
founded (in the North as well as the South) were so permeated with
notions of nature's hierarchy-the distribution of sentiments and
powers according to an imagined set of "natural" or divine ordinances-
that no other conclusion seemed possible.... Although Babo acts
according to the laws both of nature and of the revolutionary fathers,
Delano cannot conceive of such action in black slaves. .. . [Tihe
"natural" relationship of master and slave defined by the fathers,





that the deponent, not undisturbed in his mind by recent
events, raved of some things which could never have hap-
pened" (103). Corrobating testimony confirmed Benito's
account, however. Why the concern with the trustworthi-
ness of Benito? Perhaps there is a sense that the violent
acts were so horrible that it was unlikely that they took
place. But it seems more likely that the judges were con-
cerned because they could not believe that slaves could
have engineered such a compelling, successful deception.
That is, the slaves were incapable of the subtlety, intelli-
gence, rationality, and planning that went into the mutiny,
as well as not having the ability to manipulate and deceive
white men sophisticated in the ways of the world.
Maybe that was the most terrifying thought of all: at
any moment, slaves might be in control, or about to assert
control, and those who have for so long reflexively occupied
the master's position might not even recognize the possibil-
ity. Delano, in one of his crises of confidence (concerned
more at the time with the threat of Benito than with Babo),
observes: "If Don Benito's story was throughout an inven-
tion, then every soul on board ... was his carefully drilled
recruit in the plot: an incredible inference" (69). Inferiors
simply were not capable of behaving this way; to do so
violated fundamental legal and social expectations and
norms.
The deposition, then, reflects law's triumph. Lest we
misunderstand law's function, it is made manifest at the
end of the story. Law becomes the social instrument for re-
storing order and resolving "gray" into black and white. The
deposition is a human voice that has been absorbed by and
transmitted from the legal system, as opposed to the narra-
tor's voice or the voices (unmediated) of his characters. Law
controls everything at the end, even the telling of the
story."
60.
In its extreme act of countersubversion, the deposition overthrows the
suspended irony that momentarily makes master slave and slave
master, undoes roles and scenes in which rebellious metaphors have
come dangerously close to becoming literal, restores the good weather
and smooth sailing of a racially hierarchical "natural" world, and
retrospectively suppresses the revolt of Melville's fictional version of
1216 [Vol. 52
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Finally, there is the question of Babo's silence. Upon
capturing Babo, Delano places him "below out of view" (100)
on board his own ship (perhaps society's preferred place for
slavery) because Benito refuses to board until Babo is
removed from sight. Though Benito and various sailors tes-
tify for the tribunal, Babo does not. After capture, "[s]eeing
all was over, he uttered no sound, and could not be forced
to. His aspect seemed to say, since I cannot do deeds, I will
not speak words" (116). After conviction, "the black met his
voiceless end" (116). The slave's voice in a legal relationship
of hierarchy and dependence is not heard.6 Effectively
silenced, he has no way to shape his destiny other than to
revolt. The cost of silencing those on the bottom may be
fatal to us all. As Melville put it on another occasion, "we
should remember that emancipation was accomplished not
by deliberate legislation; only through agonized violence
could so mighty a result be effected." Babo, silenced, cer-
tainly is not an example of an individual exercising his
Delano's history. The law of slavery, Melville seems to say, is the law
of history.
Id. at 180.
61. Babo's silence has been analogized to the silencing of alleged fugitive
slaves under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, the terms of which did not permit
the accused to testify at all. The condemnation of this aspect of the law was
powerfully made by Frederick Douglass: "Let it be thundered around the world,
that, in tyrant-killing, king-hating, people-loving, democratic, Christian
America, the seats of justice are filled with judges, who.., are bound, in
deciding in the case of a man's liberty, to hear only his accusers." FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, What to the Slave Is the Fourth of July?: An Address Delivered in
Rochester, New York, On 5 July 1852, in 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS,
SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS 1847-1854, at 359, 376 (John
W. Blassingame ed., 1982). The relevance of the Fugitive Slave Act to Babo's
silencing has not been lost on modern critics:
Babo's silence is trebly appropriate: it expresses not only the
intransigence of Negro rebels and voiceless black experience, but the
status of black slaves in America. Legally, a black man's speech did not
exist: his testimony stood inadmissible in court, his literacy forbidden
by law, quite literally he stood mute.
Jean Fagan Yellin, Black Masks: Melville's Benito Cereno, 22 AM. Q. 678, 688
(1970). See also CHRISTINA ACCOMANDO, "THE REGULATION OF ROBBERS": LEGAL
FICTIONS OF SLAVERY AND RESISTANCE 32-35 (2001); Maurice S. Lee, Melville's
Subversive Political Philosophy: Benito Cereno and the Fate of Speech, 72 AM.
LITERATURE 495, 511 (2000).
62. THE BATTLE-PIECES OF HERMAN MELVILLE, supra note 47, at 200.
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freedom as a manifestation of equality in the eyes of the
law.
63
When Delano tries to bring Benito back to his senses
and to health, the American urges his Spanish counterpart
to forget what has happened. "But the past is passed," says
the cheerful, optimistic New Englander in the face of slav-
ery, "why moralize upon it?" (116). His is not Shakespeare's
past as prologue; it is not full of warnings or foreshadow-
ing.64 "Forget it," says Delano. "See, yon bright sun has
forgotten it all, and the blue sea, and the blue sky; these
have turned over new leaves" (116). But Benito replies, "Be-
cause they have no memory" (116). Delano would like to put
the experience behind him or continue to live life as he
expects it. He, after all, sent his crew to recapture the slave
ship, liberate the slaveship's crew, and seize the remaining
valuable property, the slave cargo. No questioning, no sub-
versive messages, no lessons, no insight. The world goes on,
everyone knows his place and is governed accordingly.
Hierarchical relationships are the way society is and should
be organized. Yet it is law that determines that structure;
Melville seems to believe that law is as responsible for these
abuses of power as are any of our social institutions, be-
cause law creates a way of ordering social relationships that
verifies authority and is inimical to equality.65
63.
In between rebellion and suppression, or between the creation of
authority and its exercise of mastery and decay into enslaving
conventions, lies silence. Frozen in indecision, the law derived from the
Creole and Amistad cases, like the logic of the Fugitive Slave Law, was
silent on the only issue that mattered to Babo. His silence, in turn, is
the most powerful articulation of those unrecognized rights, no matter
that they in turn may lead to the creation of a new racial hierarchy
grounded in naked power.
SUNDQUIST, supra note 34, at 181.
64. For a perceptive observation on this point of comparison with
Shakespeare's The Tempest, see Aviam Soifer, Reviewing Legal Fictions, 20 GA.
L. REV. 871, 885 (1986).
65.
Babo will not speak within the language of a law that does not apply to
him. As the paradoxical Creole and Amistad cases suggested, the rebels
might legally be slaves by rule of law, according to the state code of
chattelism that could be adduced in certain circumstances; but in truth
they were, no matter, not slaves. The law of slavery, the law of "man"
and "thing," was a pure tautology in which is and is not, mastery and
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Perhaps slavery, however, is an anomaly, (even
discounting for Delano's possible experience of it as it lin-
gered in the North). But can slavery, even given its brutal-
ity and severe exploitiveness, be conceived of as existing
along a continuum of hierarchical relationships, a particu-
larly cruel and severe example of relationships, voluntary
and involuntary, of dependency, not unlike, for instance,
the way the world is organized for parent-child, husband-
wife, town-pauper? Along these lines, Melville has given us
Bartleby in which he probes another legal relationship,
master-servant, one ostensibly central to the meaning of
freedom in America. It is a paradigm of how one is expected




Most of the story of Bartleby, originally published in
1853, transpires in a Wall Street law office, in which
resides a lawyer, who is "a rather elderly man" (13); two
copyists or scriveners; and an office boy. The tale is nar-
rated by the attorney, who describes himself as "one of
those unambitious lawyers who never addresses a jury"
(14), in other words, an office lawyer. He is an "eminently
safe man," who at one time counted among his clients, John
Jacob Astor, "a name which, I admit, I love to repeat, for it
hath a rounded and orbicular sound to it, and rings like
unto bullion" (14). The elderly lawyer became a master in
chancery. As a result of his increased business, he needed
additional help in the office. Moreover, his two copyists,
Turkey and Nippers, alternated between bouts of drinking
and indigestion respectively, which left each of them less
than productive for a large part of the working day. In
bondage, were entangled in a spiraling dialectic. In such a world
violence followed by silence was enough to count as freedom.
SUNDQUIST, supra note 34, at 182.
66. All citations to passages from Bartleby are from HERMAN MELVILLE,
Bartleby, the Scrivener, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF HERMAN MELVILLE: THE PIAZZA
TALES AND OTHER PROSE PIECES, 1839-1860, at 13 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds.,




response to an advertisement for an additional scrivener,
there appeared Bartleby, "pallidly neat, pitiably respect-
able, incurably forlorn!" (19).
"At first, Bartleby did an extraordinary quantity of
writing" (19). But slowly Bartleby began to reject various
tasks associated with his work, proclaiming simply and
repeatedly-when asked to perform--"jI would prefer not to"
(20). The lawyer employs a series of strategies with
Bartleby as he attempts to understand Bartleby's refusal to
work. As Bartleby withdraws further and further from his
work and social environment, the lawyer reasons with him,
offers him benevolent assistance, is patient with him, and
tries to fire him, all to no avail. Increasingly the lawyer's
office routine is in turmoil. He even discovers eventually
that Bartleby is living in the law offices at night.
The lawyer lives by a set of assumptions about how his
office should operate. None of those assumptions coincides
with Bartleby's preference not to participate in the life of
the office, and so the lawyer becomes baffled, exasperated,
frustrated, and distressed by Bartleby. Because the lawyer
cannot get rid of Bartleby, he stages a kind of reverse evic-
tion, abandoning his offices and leasing new quarters,
leaving Bartleby behind to fend for himself. But Bartleby
haunts the old building, prompting the lawyer's old land-
lord to appeal to the lawyer to find a way to remove
Bartleby. Finally, the police take Bartleby from the office
building and he is placed in the Tombs, the New York City
prison. The lawyer visits him there, attempts to provide for
his needs, but Bartleby dies shortly thereafter, presumably
literally having starved himself to death, a symbol of com-
plete alienation from all that surrounds him. Unable to
account for Bartleby, the lawyer finds a possible clue in a
rumor that Bartleby once worked in the Dead Letter Office
in Washington.
B. History
What may have inspired Melville to write Bartleby is
not as readily apparent as it was for Benito Cereno, or as,
will be apparent, as we shall see, in Billy Budd. In the
range of conjecture, we know Melville might have had a di-
rect interest in Wall Street law offices because his brother
Allan, with whom he lived from time to time, had his law
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offices on Wall Street.67 And if Bartleby is ultimately about
work, we also know Melville visited factories occasionally. 8
On the other hand, there is a striking similarity be-
tween the beginning of Bartleby and a contemporaneous
New York newspaper story from 1853, "The Lawyer's Story;
Or the Wrongs of the Orphans By a Member of the Bar."
The story begins: "In the summer of 1843, having an
extraordinary quantity of deeds to copy, I engaged, tempo-
rarily, an extra copying clerk, who interested me considera-
bly, in consequence of his modest, quiet, gentlemanly
demeanor, and in his intense application to his duties." 9 As
Dan McCall has said, "I think anyone who has read
'Bartleby' carefully will tremble a little when reading the
first sentence of the newspaper story."" In addition, the
clerk responded to the lawyer's questions by saying "I would
prefer." 1 This then must be the smoking gun. As McCall
points out, however, there are "significant differences"
between the two stories.72 McCall quickly turns his atten-
tion to two other possible sources: Biblical passages and
Emerson's essay, "The Transcendentalist."73 On the other
hand, McCall spends some time refuting Michael Rogin's
suggestion that Melville was moved by Thoreau's essay,
"Civil Disobedience."74
David Reynolds has suggested provocatively that
Melville was developing ideas about Wall Street initially
suggested by George Foster in his 1849 work, New York in
67. For Allan Melville, see NEWMAN, supra note 33, at 21-22.
68. For a factory visit, see CINDY WEINSTEIN, THE LITERATURE OF LABOR AND
THE LABORS OF LITERATURE: ALLEGORY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN
FICTION 87 (1995).
69. Quoted in DAN MCCALL, THE SILENCE OF BARTLEBY 2 (1989). The
newspaper article was discovered by Johannes Dietrich Bergmann. See
Johannes Dietrich Bergmann, Bartleby and The Lawyer's Story, 47 AM.
LITERATURE 432, 432-33 (1975). The newspaper excerpts appeared as an
advertisement for James Maitland's novel The Lawyer's Story.
70. MCCALL, supra note 69, at 1.
71. Id. at 2.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 4-9.
74. See id. at 59-77. For Rogin's idea, see ROGIN, supra note 44, at 195.
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Slices.75 And Barbara Foley contends that Bartleby is
Melville's ambiguous and ambivalent reaction to the Astor
Place Riots that occurred in New York in 1849.76 Role mod-
els have been suggested for both the lawyer narrator and
Bartleby, ranging from friends, relatives, and acquain-
tances; Melville himself; Nathaniel Hawthorne; and, of
course, the ubiquitous Lemuel Shaw."
There may not be any definitive source for Bartleby,
any more than it is clear what Bartleby is actually about.
My guess, from the variety of influences that have been
suggested, is that Bartleby is a reflection of the way
Melville observed, noted, and distilled a whole series of
events and experiences from friends and acquaintances to
reading to whatever. Yet Melville gave to it his own unique
blend of imagination and passion. In the process, it seems
to me, he also revealed something about law and how it op-
erates in the context of the employment relationship.
C. Law
The employment relationship is voluntary, and
Bartleby has decided for some reason to stop participating
in it. He apparently has determined that the relationship
itself does not work, 7  and has voluntarily withdrawn his
75. DAVID S. REYNOLDS, BENEATH THE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE: THE
SUBVERSIVE IMAGINATION IN THE AGE OF EMERSON AND MELVILLE 295 (1989).
76. See Foley, supra note 14.
77. For a summary of the various attributions, see NEWMAN, supra note 33,
at 22-23 (for friends); ROGIN, supra note 44, at 193-94 (for friends); MCCALL,
supra note 69, at 91-94 (for an analysis of the literature on Melville as
Bartleby); id. at 79-98 (for an analysis of the literature on Hawthorne as
Bartleby); NEWMAN, supra note 33, at 21-22 (for Shaw).
78. Peter M. Blau's classic sociological study summarizes these
understandings:
The employment contract into which the management of an
organization enters with its members is a legal institution that
obligates the members to furnish certain services and to follow
managerial directives in exchange for a salary or wage. These
obligations are reinforced by institutionalized norms in our culture
according to which employers have a right to expect their employees to
comply with their directives as well as to perform specified duties
faithfully.
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services. The question is what motivates him to behave in
this way. The lawyer/narrator is confused because Bartleby,
in exercising his freedom to exit the employment relation-
ship, refuses to exit the workplace.
The clue may lie in the tension between the
expectations of the employer and the experiences of the
worker. Both parties bring expectations to the relationship.
While both may appear to be participants in a regime of
free labor with all that the concept implies, that regime op-
erates as a system of hierarchy and dependence, which the
employer takes for granted in Bartleby and the worker
rejects. The master wants an explanation. The servant
thinks his conduct speaks for itself and refuses to explain.
The legal standard as applied in the nineteenth century
was simple. As Henry Williams, a delegate to the 1853
Massachusetts state constitutional convention, observed,
In a free government like ours, employment is simply a contract
between parties having equal rights. The operative agrees to
perform a certain amount of work in consideration of receiving a
certain amount of money .... The employed is under no greater
obligation to the employer than the employer is to the employed;
and the one has no more right to dictate [outside of work] than the
other. In the eye of the law, they are both freemen-citizens
having equal rights, and brethren having one common 
destiny. 79
Tocqueville, America's chronicler of equality in a
democracy, presented a more nuanced and complicated de-
scription. In his observation of the social dimensions of the
legal relationship, Tocqueville depicts a social reality quite
different from Williams's summary.
The master and the workman have then here no similarity, and
their differences increase every day. They are connected only like
the two rings at the extremities of a long chain. Each of them fills
the station which is made for him, and which he does not leave;
the one is continually, closely, and necessarily dependent upon the
other and seems as much born to obey as that other is to
command. What is this but aristocracy?
PETER M. BLAU, EXCHANGE AND POWER IN SOCIAL LIFE 205 (1964) (footnote
omitted).
79. 1 Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings in the State
Convention, Assembled May 4th, 1853, at 550 (Boston 1853).
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... Their relative position is not a permanent one; they are
constantly drawn together or separated by their interests. The
workman is generally dependent on the master, but not on any
particular master; these two men meet in the factory, but do not
know each other elsewhere; and while they come into contact on
one point, they stand very far apart on all others. The
manufacturer asks nothing of the workman but his labor; the
workman expects nothing from him but his wages. The one
contracts no obligation to protect nor the other to defend, and they
are not permanently connected either by habit or by duty....
The territorial aristocracy of former ages was either bound by
law, or thought itself bound by usage, to come to the relief of its
serving-men and to relieve their distresses. But the manufacturing
aristocracy of our age first impoverishes and debases the men who
serve it and then abandons them to be supported by the charity of
the public....
I am of the opinion, on the whole, that the manufacturing
aristocracy which is growing up under our eyes is one of the
harshest that ever existed in the world; but at the same time it is
one of the most confined and least dangerous. Nevertheless, the
friends of democracy should keep their eyes anxiously fixed in this
direction; for if ever a permanent inequality of conditions and
aristocracy again penetrates into the world, it may be predicted
that this is the gate by which they will enter.
It would not, then, be true to assert that in democratic society
the relation of servants and masters is disorganized; it is
organized on another footing; the rule is different, but there is a
rule. °
Though an abstract equality of individual rights is
Williams's sentiment, Tocqueville casts doubt on that
assumption. Melville subtly develops the gap through the
character of Bartleby."
80. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 159-61, 183 (Phillips
Bradley ed., 1945).
81. There has been a remarkable explosion in the last decade or so in the
field of American labor law history. In helping to understand Bartleby, I have
found particularly suggestive Robert Steinfeld's important work which offers a
sophisticated portrait of nineteenth-century freedoms significantly constrained
by legally sanctioned categories of coercion in the employment relationship. See
ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT, AND FREE LABOR IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (2001); ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE
LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND
CULTURE, 1350-1870 (1991). Karen Orren has asserted the remarkable
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resilience and endurance into the nineteenth century of legal categories of
master and servant that are feudal in origin. KAREN ORREN, BELATED
FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1991). It is interesting to note that Joyce Appleby, whose scholarly career has
been devoted in considerable measure to demonstrating how economic
liberalism and capitalism have led to progress and opportunity, apparently
exempts a significant portion of the population from her analysis: women and
the increasingly industrial work force as it converted from agricultural labor.
Perhaps influenced by Orren's work, Appleby has noted that
the growth of industry increased the number of wage-earners, which
meant enlarging the domain of common law's master-servant
strictures. The common law assured that submission in the private
realm of work would continue even as the ambit of freedom for
ordinary white men increased in the public sphere....
The democratization of American society supplied the passion, the
issues, and the discourses necessary for detaching the country from its
monarchical roots. The surviving common law, however, unobtrusively
sustained the domination of the master in the home and the workplace.
APPLEBY, supra note 16, at 51, 55. See also CHRISTOPHER TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR,
AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1993).
John Witt has observed that
the new histories of the employment contract contend that the
nineteenth-century law of employment constructed a prescriptive
status hierarchy through the judicial elaboration of implied doctrines of
contractual construction [i.e. default rules]....
A central contention of the new histories of the law of free labor is
that the nineteenth-century law of the employment contract assigned
the vast majority of American employees to the subordinate position in
a workplace status hierarchy. The claim is not merely that legal
coercion characterized the employment contracts of former slaves and
the very poor under the Black Codes, the Freedmen's Bureau, and the
vagrancy laws; nor is it the neo-Halean view that the law of property,
contract, and tort allocated resources in such a way as to
systematically disadvantage workers. Rather, it is that the law of the
labor contract itself constructed a prescriptive status regime.
John Fabian Witt, Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract,
Again, 18 LAW & HIST. REV. 627, 629, 631 (2000). Witt himself remains
skeptical of the broader interpretive claims, and he
outlines the limits of the new histories' only explanation of the social
consequences of default rules, namely that they had an ideological or
norm-shaping effect....
This is not to say, of course, that the default terms of the law of
employment did not matter. The point here is that the new histories of
the nineteenth-century employment contract do not have an adequate
account of why they mattered.
Id. at 629-30.
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Bartleby and another Melville short story written about
the same time, The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus
of Maids," develop parallel themes on the subject of the
employment relationship, themes that resonate with
Tocqueville's insights about the status of workers in
America. Paradise of Bachelors has two parts; it is a
diptych with the facts of each part seemingly unrelated.
The first is an account of a dinner gathering of a group of
nine bachelor lawyers in London, an exercise in conspicuous
consumption and conviviality removed from the cares of the
world. "It was the very perfection of quiet absorption of
good living, good drinking, good feeling, and good talk. We
were a band of brothers. Comfort-fraternal, household
comfort, was the grand trait of the affair" (322). Similarly,
the lawyer in Bartleby seems to be a bachelor (we actually
learn nothing about whether or not he has a family), and he
"does a snug business among rich men's bonds, and mort-
gages, and title-deeds" (Bartleby, p. 14). But here it is
Bartleby and not his employer who, at least at first,"gorges" himself on the lawyer's documents. And it also
seems unlikely that it is an accident that Delano's ship in
Benito Cereno (published almost contemporaneously with
The Paradise of Bachelors) is named the "Bachelor's
Delight," perhaps a symbol of Delano's unquestioning com-
placency.
The second part of the story contrasts the lives of the
bachelors with those of the maids, and it evokes comparison
to Bartleby himself. The maids are female factory
operatives working in a paper manufactory in the Berk-
shires. As Bartleby mechanically copies documents, so the
maids are controlled by the machines they tend.
Not a syllable was breathed. Nothing was heard but the low,
steady overruling hum of the iron animals. The human voice was
banished from the spot. Machinery-that vaunted slave of
humanity-here stood menially served by human beings, who
82. All citations to passages from The Paradise of Bachelors and the
Tartarus of Maids are from HERMAN MELVILLE, The Paradise of Bachelors and
the Tartarus of Maids, in 9 THE WRITINGS OF HERMAN MELVILLE: THE PIAZZA
TALES AND OTHER PROSE PIECES, 1839-1860, at 316 (Harrison Hayford et al.
eds., 1987). The page citations immediately follow the quotations in the body of
the text itself. Bartleby "was probably written in the summer of 1853"; The
Paradise of Bachelors was written "probably during the fall and winter of 1853-
54." NEWMAN, supra note 33, at 20, 283.
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served mutely and cringingly as the slave serves the Sultan. The
girls did not so much seem accessory wheels to the general
machinery as mere cogs to the wheel (328).
The effect on the girls is striking. They are "like so many
mares haltered to the rack" (329), and like Bartleby, they
are "pallid." ("The yet more pallid faces of all the pallid
girls" (334)).83
The women's dependency is highlighted by a direct
inquiry about their status.
"The girls," echoed I, glancing round at their silent forms. "Why
is it, sir, that in most factories, female operatives, of whatever age,
are indiscriminately called girls, never women?"
"Oh! As to that-why, I suppose, the fact of their being generally
unmarried-that's the reason, I should think. But it never struck
me before. For our factory here, we will not have married women;
they are apt to be off-and-on too much. We want none but steady
workers: twelve hours to the day, day after day, through the three
hundred and sixty-five days, excepting Sundays, Thanksgiving,
and Fast-days. That's our rule. And so, having no married women,
what females we have are rightly enough called girls" (334).
Unmarried women are preferred because the assumption is
that they will not be deflected from work; they can be relied'
on and their sole responsibility is to the machine, the
factory, and the owner. No one else competes for their
energies and time. They are free, but subservient, women,
now "girls." Their voices are "banished"; they stand
83.
As the title suggests, this is a diptych made up of two contrasting,
complementary parts, evenly divided and inversely matching. On one
side, there is convivial ambience, culinary delight, and carefree
association, a world occupied exclusively by men. On the other side,
there is a brutal environment, regimented labor, and physical misery, a
world occupied monotonously by women.
Given this complementary structure-this antithesis of privilege and
oppression-it is hardly surprising that the men should happen to be
bachelors. For bachelorhood, here and elsewhere in Melville, is a
species of manhood singled out for its privilege ....
WAI CHEE DIMOCK, RESIDUES OF JUSTICE: LITERATURE, LAW, PHILOSOPHY 80
(1996). Nancy Fredricks has commented that more than a contrast is suggested:
"The diptych structure here implies that the extravagant lifestyle of the lawyer
bachelors is linked-even depends upon-the deprivation of the oppressed
maids at work in the paper factory." FREDRICKS, supra note 29, at 118.
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"mutely" before those, who like Bartleby, prefer not to hear
them."
In Bartleby, clues to the lawyer's attitudes about the
employment relationship are revealed through his interac-
tions with and evaluations of the two other scriveners,
Turkey and Nippers. Turkey, is about sixty years old, "a
short, pursy Englishman" (15). He is described by the law-
yer, as having "natural civility and deference, as a depend-
ent Englishman" (17). Turkey constantly addresses the
lawyer by first saying, "With submission, sir" (16). He is
steady, reliable, and knows his place, perhaps reflecting
some traditional English understanding of the mas-
ter/servant relationship." Yet Turkey is only reliable in the
84.
[The story] segregates the sexes to reverse their stereotypical
occupations. The lawyers, unengaged in productive work, fail to leave
their mark on the world. All they do is eat in Paradise, parodying
consumption in the home. The daughters who had done household
work on the farm now "undertake rough laborer's work" in the factory.
Deprived of a domestic family circle, these celibate maids find their
home in the mill.
The new mills appropriated both the women's work of household
manufacture, and the women who engaged in it. As the factories drew
work out of the home, their defenders justified them in familial terms.
Factories, it was said, replaced domestic paternal supervision. They
would instill in the mill girls "habits of order, regularity and industry,
which lay a broad and deep foundation of public and private future
usefullness."
ROGIN, supra note 44, at 202-03.
85.
[Tihe narrator's paternalistic attitude . . . seems more appropriate to
the antiquated, vaguely feudal world of masters and servants than to
the actual working conditions emerging in mid-nineteenth-century
America.... In keeping with the hierarchical structure of master-
servant relations, he wants his subordinates to know their own place
as well as to show respect to him; . . . he has high praise for Turkey's
"natural civility and deference, as a dependent Englishman."
The lawyer ... formed his economic views in an earlier stage of
capitalist development; in certain respects he literally does belong to
the world of masters and servants, or at least master and apprentices
MICHAEL T. GILMORE, AMERICAN ROMANTICISM AND THE MARKETPLACE 133
(1985).
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morning until his noon dinnertime, when he drinks, or
imbibes in "red ink" (17). He returns unsteady, cranky, un-
productive. Indeed, he sometimes returns "slightly rash
with his tongue, in fact, insolent" (16).
Nippers, on the other hand, is always irritable and testy
in the morning because of indigestion. He calms down in
the afternoon and becomes productive. Before noon he
constantly tries to adjust his writing desk because his back
is uncomfortable. This prompts the lawyer to observe,
"[T]he truth of the matter was, Nippers knew not what he
wanted. Or, if he wanted any thing, it was to be rid of a
scrivener's table altogether" (17). So between the two scriv-
eners, the lawyer gets only one full day's worth of work. Yet
he never questions why the drinking or indigestion occurs;
he does not associate it with dissatisfaction with work or
working conditions. He simply attempts to accommodate his
schedule to his employees' idiosyncrasies.
When Bartleby appears, the lawyer is glad to see him
due to the burden of increased business and the episodic
habits of his overworked staff. Everything is fine:
Bartleby did an extraordinary quantity of writing. As if long
famishing for something to copy, he seemed to gorge himself on my
documents. There was no pause for digestion. He ran a day and
night line, copying by sun-light and by candle-light. I should have
been quite delighted with his application, had he been cheerfully
industrious. But he wrote on silently, palely, mechanically (19-20).
The work environment the lawyer provides for
Bartleby, however, may be part of the problem. Bartleby's
desk faces a window that "commanded at present no view at
all... within three feet of the panes was a wall" (19). This
isolation is compounded by the fact that inside the room
where Bartleby works in proximity to the lawyer, "I
procured a high green folding screen, which might entirely
isolate Bartleby from my sight, though not remove him
from my voice. And thus, in a manner, privacy and society
were conjoined" (19). Bartleby, therefore, is literally both
walled in (as if a prisoner) and walled out and off. There is
as little connection between master and servant as possible;
this is not master and journeyman within an artisanal
economy, working and living together under the same roof.
Isolation is the preferred norm.
But then one day the lawyer commands or summons
Bartleby to appear from behind the screen, to help with a
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simple office chore, and the world changes forever. For in
response Bartleby simply announces that " 'I would prefer
not to' "(20).
The lawyer is uncomprehending:
I sat awhile in perfect silence, rallying my stunned faculties.
Immediately it occurred to me that my ears had deceived me, or
Bartleby had entirely misunderstood my meaning. I repeated my
request in the clearest tone I could assume. But in quite as clear a
one came the previous reply, "I would prefer not to."
"Prefer not to," echoed I, rising in high excitement, and crossing
the room with a stride. "What do you mean? Are you moon-struck?
I want you to help me compare this sheet here-take it," and I
thrust it towards him.
"I would prefer not to," said he.
I looked at him steadfastly. His face was leanly composed; his
gray eye dimly calm. Not a wrinkle of agitation rippled him. Had
there been the least uneasiness, anger, impatience or impertinence
in his manner; in other words, had there been any thing ordinarily
human about him, doubtless I should have violently dismissed him
from the premises (20-21).
Notice the lawyer is prepared to fire his employee if
Bartleby displays any attitudes that violate the lawyer's
understanding of how the relationship should function.
"Impertinence" will not be tolerated. It is not acceptable in
a hierarchical workplace; deference "with submission, sir,"
is expected.
The lawyer finds the interlude "strange," but because
his "business hurried [him]," he decided "to forget the
matter for the present" (21). Having accommodated Turkey
and Nippers, perhaps the lawyer now was prepared to do
the same for Bartleby, or at least to suspend judgment for
the "present." The lawyer, after all, proclaims "a profound
conviction that the easiest way of life is the best" (14). He
did not have to wait long for the episode to repeat itself
however. After Bartleby had "concluded four lengthy docu-
ments," the lawyer gathered the staff together to engage in
the laborious process of proofreading. When summoned to
participate in the proofing of his work, Bartleby refuses: "I
would prefer not to." The lawyer, as any lawyer might do,
"began to reason with" (21) Bartleby, but Bartleby will not
listen to reason.
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It is not clear why Bartleby is refusing to read proofs or
to do small chores. Perhaps he does not want to be deflected
from the more significant responsibility of copying because
he chooses to do it and is not just acting at the behest of the
lawyer. Perhaps he doesn't think those tasks fall within his
job description, that his compensation does not cover those
additional responsibilities, or perhaps he wishes to readjust
the wage bargain; perhaps he is only asserting his indi-
viduality in the face of the wooden and mechanical job of
copying. But then why copy at all? Whatever Bartleby's
motivation, however, it seems clear that his target is the
employment relationship itself, that he is directly subvert-
ing the relations of superior to inferior, just as Babo did so
dramatically in Benito Cereno. But Bartleby is using
precisely the opposite strategy: total passivity rather than
bloody violence.
The lawyer's first appeal is to the logic of the wage bar-
gain, the job. Proofing is included with copying. "It is labor
saving to you .... It is common usage. Every copyist is
bound to help examine his copy. Is it not so? Will you not
speak? Answer!" (22). And again, "You are decided, then,
not to comply with my request-request made according to
common usage and common sense?" (22). It is as if the
attorney is appealing to the common law ("usage" and
"sense") to vindicate his right to have his worker do his job
under the contract of employment. Bartleby will not
respond to the invocation of contract, however. Not
surprisingly, the other scriveners understand what is at
stake. Nippers grouses that this was "the last time he
would do another man's business without pay" (23).
In desperation, the lawyer briefly abandons the con-
tractual appeal for recourse to an earlier model for organ-
izing work. Will not Bartleby "come forth and do [his]
duty?" (22). Perhaps the lawyer's strategy is that "duty" in a
dependent relationship will strike a responsive chord in
Bartleby if the requirements of a market bargain will not.
But Bartleby "vouchsafed no reply" (22).
The lawyer is perplexed. He is "aggravat[ed]" by what
he describes as a "passive resistance" (23). Part of his
response is to act "charitably," with patience, forbearance,
or understanding. His next response is quite admirable in




Poor fellow! thought I, he means no mischief; it is plain he intends
no insolence; his aspect sufficiently evinces that his eccentricities
are involuntary. He is useful to me. I can get along with him. If I
turn him away, the chances are he will fall in with some less in-
dulgent employer, and then he will be rudely treated, and perhaps
driven forth miserably to starve. Yes. Here I can cheaply purchase
a delicious self-approval. To befriend Bartleby; to humor him in
his strange willfulness, will cost me little or nothing, while I lay up
in my soul what will eventually prove a sweet morsel for my
conscience (23-24).
The cost/benefit analysis of the lawyer's charity is
striking, but so is the fact that the lawyer is treating
Bartleby less as if they were equals bargaining in the mar-
ketplace and more as if he had a particular obligation
toward a dependent of his. He convinces himself, however
that it is in his best interest to perform this obligation. 8
Whatever the model-a false and not a real equality, or a
real hierarchy and dependency and a sense of reciprocal
obligation-Bartleby seems to resent the lawyer's initiative,
and will not participate any longer in the relationship.
A number of further episodes test the limits-jobs,
errands, tasks. All requested; all refused. One could
construe Bartleby's refusals as the ultimate job action, or
the complete assertion of worker's control, except that the
worker does not apparently want to seize control in order to
produce work more efficiently, better, or humanely. Instead,
he appears to deny the necessity of work at all, at least as
currently organized.
The effect of this denial is to turn the traditional rela-
tionship of master and servant on its head. The lawyer
seems to believe that the wage bargain confers on him the
right to expect a certain set of responses from his employ-
ees, as if he has purchased their deference and submission.
Hierarchy is assumed because he is paying the wages. He is
not hasty or abusive, just insistent. Thus, Bartleby asserts
control by simply refusing to participate according to the
usual assumptions inherent in the relationship. For
Bartleby, consent does not alter the fact of dependence, just,
86. "The lawyer's paternalism simply precludes any acknowledgement of his
employees' autonomy. His act of charity is symptomatic of his shortcomings.
[Charity has] the virtue of a personal gesture, but unlike higher wages, which
are earned, it assumes a dynamic of dependency and indebtedness." Id. at 134-
35.
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as Tocqueville might suggest, its nature or structure. Sud-
denly, the lawyer "burned to be rebelled against again" (24).
He attempts to provoke Bartleby. "Was there any other
thing in which I could procure myself to be ignominiously
repulsed by this lean, penniless wight? -my hired clerk?
What added thing is there, perfectly reasonable, that he
will be sure to refuse to do?" (25).
In a sense, Bartleby has rewritten the agreement
between the two of them. The master has been forced to
adapt to the requirements or preferences of the servant. 7
87.
The employer-employee relationship, as the dominant social
relationship in the workplace, was relatively new for the United States,
where many people had been independent farmers and self-employed
craftsmen. With the growth of the factory system and expanded
commerce and banking, more and more people ceased to be able to act
on their preferences in the workplace. In their new status as hired
hands, their time was not their own. They were subordinates expected
to obey orders from their employer. When Bartleby refused to play his
assigned role in this context, the narrator says he felt himself
"ignominiously repulsed by this lean, penniless wight... my hired
clerk," making it clear that although all men may have been "created
equal," that equality has been destroyed in the employer-employee
relationship.
Irving Adler, Equity, Law and Bartleby, 51 Sci. & Soc'Y 468, 470 (1988).
Law's role in this process has, of course, not gone unnoticed. As Christopher
Tomlins observed:
It is equally important to an understanding of the nineteenth-century
employment relationship, however, to realize that in important
respects its legal realities no more comported to the "liberal illusion" of
formal equality than its economic realities. Like monetary asymmetry,
legal asymmetries meant that the parties to an employment
relationship coexisted under conditions of structured inequality.
The relationship itself appears as a realm in which inequality of
power is a routine incident, consequential upon the additional rights of
control imputed in legal descriptions of employment to inhere in the
employer. The operative's decision to enter employment is thus also a
decision to become subject to the employer's power. Indeed, to many
nineteenth-century writers and courts the existence of a condition of
subjection to authority was conclusive in determining whether a
relationship of employment in fact existed between two parties.
The presumption that the act of entering employment was
simultaneously an accession by the employee to the exercise of
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The lawyer acknowledges as much when he observes that,
though he occasionally gets angry at Bartleby, "it was
exceeding difficult to bear in mind all the time those
strange peculiarities, privileges, and unheard of exemp-
tions, forming the tacit stipulations on Bartleby's part
under which he remained in my office" (26). Slowly Bartleby
retrains the lawyer, for "every added repulse of this sort
which I received only tended to lessen the probability of my
repeating the inadvertence"(26).
The reversal of roles is recognized when the lawyer
inadvertently discovers that Bartleby is living in the law
office. After stopping at the office on a Sunday morning, the
lawyer is told by Bartleby from behind the locked door to
return later before he will be admitted. "I slunk away from
my own door" (27). He confesses "sundry twinges of impo-
tent rebellion against the mild effrontery of this unaccount-
able scrivener" (27). He is used to dictating to his employ-
ees, not being dictated to. He concedes "that one, for the
time, is a sort of unmanned when he tranquilly permits his
hired clerk to dictate to him, and order him away from his
own premises" (27). Ironically, Bartleby is now living in his
workplace, as employers and employees once did together,
though the employer is now gone, almost entirely separated
from both his place of work and his workers. 8 At night,
authority and control by the employer echoes throughout the case law
of the first half of the nineteenth century. Conceiving employment as a
relation of legal subordination, however, sat oddly with the courts'
simultaneous commitment to an ideology of free contract, which
represented employment as a relationship whose design was arrived at
in a process of mutual bargaining sufficiently free of power disparities
that the employee might reasonably be held responsible for the
consequences of her own decision to enter.
Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the Employment Relationship, in
LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 71, 72, 73, 88 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King
eds., 1992).
88. For the tracing of this phenomena in one community, see PAUL E.
JOHNSON, A SHOPKEEPER'S MILLENNIUM: SOCIETY AND REVIVALS IN ROCHESTER,
NEW YORK, 1815-1837, at 43-55 (1978).
Under the household regime, workmen regularly labored in their own
homes or the homes of their masters as servants or apprentices, and
the workplace was in fact hallowed by 'humanizing domestic
associations." Bartleby stirs up these ideas for the narrator not only
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alone, Bartleby has the office to himself. He asserts his
domain; he is his own master.
Quickly the lawyer returns to reassert his control,
searching Bartleby's desk. His justification for doing so is
purely legal, after all "the desk is mine, and its contents too,
so I will make bold to look within" (28). In Bartleby's ab-
sence, he can demonstrate that he has the right to readjust
the hierarchy to suit his needs.
Still, the lawyer is overwhelmed by Bartleby's lonely
plight, his "solitude" (27). And despite his inherent sense of
hierarchy, he has a glimmering, an insight about the
"common humanity" he shares with Bartleby. It is not just
a formal connection born out of a dependent status or an
arms-length bargain. "The bond of a common humanity now
drew me irresistibly to gloom. A fraternal melancholy! For
both I and Bartleby were sons of Adam" (28).
Once again, the lawyer reveals that he has been discon-
certed by the apparent reversal of roles:
I remembered a certain unconscious air of pallid-how shall I call
it?-of pallid haughtiness, say, or rather an austere reserve about
him, which had positively awed me into my tame compliance with
his eccentricities, when I had feared to ask him to do the slightest
incidental thing for me .... (28-29).
But the lawyer reluctantly recurs to his metaphor of charity
growing out of a felt obligation. He concludes that "I might
give alms to his body; but his body did not pain him; it was
his soul that suffered, and his soul I could not reach" (29).
The lawyer simply does not understand (do any of us?) what
ails Bartleby.
The lawyer decides to make one last attempt to reach
Bartleby. If Bartleby proves unresponsive, the lawyer will
dismiss him from the office after providing him with sever-
ance pay of twenty dollars. Bartleby prefers not to respond,
and the lawyer condemns him for being "ungrateful, consid-
ering the undeniable good usage and indulgence he had
received from me" (30). Bartleby is, in short, "ungrateful" in
the way a dependent would be ungrateful in rejecting the
kindnesses of a patron. In addition, in refusing "to comply
because he defies the rational procedures of the law office but also
because he insists upon living there as if it were "a private residence."
GILMORE, supra note 85, at 136-37.
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as far as may be with the usages of the office" (30), Bartleby
fails to fulfill the requirements of the job at the command of
the employer.
The situation becomes even more intolerable for the at-
torney when he realizes that he and the scriveners have
unconsciously started to use the phrase "prefer" on a regu-
lar basis. Bartleby has so insinuated himself into the office,
so dominated its presence by his withdrawal from work,
that he has affected the culture of the workplace. They are
all beginning to sound like him. Bartleby sets the example,
not his employer.
Finally, Bartleby announces that he will do "no more
writing" (31). When the lawyer asks him why, Bartleby
simply answers, "Do you not see the reason for yourself?"
(32). The attorney thinks Bartleby's eyes have been affected
by copying documents in a dim light, a kind of occupational
injury, but Bartleby declines to do any chore at all in the
office. All he says is that " 'I have given up copying' " (32).
Has he resigned? Retired? Breached his contract?
Finding Bartleby a "millstone ... useless ... afflictive
to bear" (32), the lawyer finally resolves to act. He renews
his previous severance pay idea, since he now views
Bartleby as a drain on his law practice, and unproductive.
"[Niecessities connected with my business tyrannized over
all other considerations" (32). Practicality overcomes char-
ity, and he gives Bartleby six days notice to leave. Yet, at
the expiration of the six days, Bartleby is still there,
because he prefers not to leave.
Because he assumes that Bartleby will take the money
offered and depart, the attorney at first believes Bartleby
has vacated the premises. The lawyer congratulates himself
for his "masterly management in getting rid of Bartleby.
Masterly I call it" (33). But he soon discovers the limitations
of being the "master" of Bartleby. The rational, reasoned
approach fails, and the lawyer concludes that "[tihe great
point was, not whether I had assumed that he would quit
me, but whether he would prefer so to do. He was more a
man of preferences than assumptions" (34).
89. For an argument that Bartleby may in fact be a victim of a workplace
injury, see Robin West, Invisible Victims: A Comparison of Susan Glaspell's
Jury of Her Peers and Herman Melville's Bartleby the Scrivener, 8 CARDOZO
STUD. L. & LITERATURE 203, 213-19 (1996).
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The lawyer had made the mistake of assuming that a
workplace functioned in a predictable, ordered way.
Bartleby apparently prefers not to believe that the office
ought to function in any particular way. As a result, the
lawyer is forced to concede Bartleby's success in reversing
the traditional hierarchy and dependence: he is now aware
that he is once "again obeying that wondrous ascendancy
which the inscrutable scrivener had over me, and from
which ascendancy, for all my chafing, I could not completely
escape" (35).
To restore the balance Bartleby has upset, the lawyer
appeals to law. At different stages, the lawyer thinks of
varying legal strategies or possibilities: He can argue or
reason with Bartleby again, or call in the police to have him
forcibly removed. Yet, as a further symbol of role reversal,
when he pleads with Bartleby to quit, Bartleby persists, "'I
would prefer not to quit you' " (35). In desperation, the law-
yer summons up legal argument, "'What earthly right have
you to stay here? Do you pay any rent? Do you pay my
taxes? Or is this property yours?' (35). All to no avail.0°
At last the lawyer admits that Bartleby is "denying my
authority"(38).91 But fearful that Bartleby may "in the end
perhaps outlive me and claim possession of my office by
right of his perpetual occupancy" (38), the lawyer gives
Bartleby his final notice. Imagining an adverse possession
claim that might be imposed against someone (just pre-
cisely against whom is not exactly clear)-in other words,
fearing the law will be used against him-the lawyer
presses on, though he is concerned once again about what
will happen if Bartleby does not withdraw voluntarily. A
forcible eviction? "Bribes"? Bartleby rejects the proffered
severance pay, which "he leaves under [the lawyer's] own
paper-weight" (38).
Then something severe, something unusual must be done. What!
surely you will not have him collared by a constable, and commit
90. "At this moment the narrator stands firmly on his prerogatives as a
laissez-faire capitalist, disclaiming any obligation to his workers save the
payment of their wages." GILMORE, supra note 85, at 136.
91. The lawyer "abdicates authority to the walls on the outside and to
Bartleby within. Bartleby forces him to behold his institution by withdrawing
even further from it. The lawyer's lack of authority makes him long for
Bartleby's approval." ROGIN, supra note 44, at 199.
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his innocent pallor to the common jail? And upon what ground
could you procure such a thing to be done?-a vagrant, is he?
What! he a vagrant, a wanderer, who refuses to budge? It is
because he will not be a vagrant, then, that you seek to count him
as a vagrant. That is too absurd. No visible means of support:
there I have him. Wrong again: for indubitably he does support
himself, and that is the only unanswerable proof that any man can
show of his possessing the means so to do. No more, then. Since he
will not quit me, I must quit him. I will change my offices; I will
move elsewhere; and give him fair notice, that if I find him on my
new premises I will then proceed against him as a common
92trespasser (38-39).
92. The lawyer's internal dialogue about his dilemma recalls Foucault's
observations about aspects of the mid-nineteenth-century French criminal
justice system.
All the illegalities that the court defined as offences the accused
reformulated as the affirmation of a living force: the lack of a home as
vagabondage, the lack of a master as independence, the lack of work as
freedom, the lack of a time-table as the fullness of days and nights.
This confrontation of illegality with the discipline-penality-delinquency
system was perceived by contemporaries or rather by the journalist
who happened to be there as the comic effect of the criminal law at
grips with the petty details of indiscipline. And it was true: the affair
itself and the verdict that followed represented the heart of the
problem of legal punishment in the nineteenth century. The irony with
which the judge tried to envelop indiscipline in the majesty of the law
and the insolence with which the accused reinscribed indiscipline
among the fundamental rights represent for penality an exemplary
scene.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 290
(1977). Foucault illustrates his point by quoting an 1840 newspaper transcript
of a judicial proceeding: "The judge: One must sleep at home.-[The accused]
Have I got a home?-[The judge] You live in perpetual vagabondage.-[The
accused] I work to earn my living. [The judge] What is your station in life?" Id.
Mingling his own analysis with contemporaneous newspaper commentary,
Foucault asks:
"What is your station? This question is the simplest expression of the
established order in society; such vagabondage is repugnant to it,
disturbs it; one must have a stable, continuous long-term station,
thoughts of the future, of a secure future, in order to reassure it
against all attacks." In short, one should have a master, be caught up
and situated within a hierarchy; one exists only when fixed in definite
relations of domination: "Who do you work with? That is to say, since
you are not a master, you must be a servant, whatever your station; it
is not a question of your satisfactoriness as an individual; it is a
question of order to be maintained." Confronted with discipline on the
face of the law, there is illegality, which puts itself forward as a right;
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Because none of the legal solutions seems feasible, and
because law is failing as Bartleby seems immune from its
intelligible categories and flaunts traditional legal under-
standings-or will not recognize the authority of law-then
the lawyer is driven from his offices to engage in his own
reverse eviction. He will leave if he cannot throw Bartleby
out. Bartleby has succeeded in turning the world upside
down.
Even after the lawyer moves into his new offices, he is
afraid that Bartleby will reappear. He "kept the door
locked, and started at every footfall in the passages" (39).
Not surprisingly, his respite is only brief. He receives a visi-
tor from his old building who reports that Bartleby is still
occupying the old rooms.
"Then, sir," said the stranger, who proved a lawyer, "you are
responsible for the man you left there. He refuses to do any
copying; he refuses to do anything; he says he prefers not to; and
he refuses to quit the premises."
"I am very sorry, sir," said I, with assumed tranquility, but an
inward tremor, "but, really, the man you allude to is nothing to
me-he is no relation or apprentice of mine, that you should hold
me responsible for him."
"In mercy's name, who is he?"
"I certainly cannot inform you. I know nothing about him.
Formerly I employed him as a copyist; but he has done nothing for
me now for some time past" (39-40).
In the lawyer's new offices, his visitor uses the meta-
phors of the old dependent master/servant relationship to
make his appeal: moral responsibility for your employees.
But Bartleby's employer will have nothing of it-"he is
nothing to me"-no relation or apprentice for whom I might
be legally responsible or to whom I might owe a legally
cognizable duty. 3 "Formally I employed him," that's all. He




The lawyer's title, Master in Chancery, evokes the personal ties of
dependence between master and apprentice. It recalls a time when
apprentices, slowly learning the skills of their trade, looked forward to
becoming masters in turn.
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is independent of me and on his own. I do not control him or
bear any responsibility for him. Bartleby's response might
have been: If you have no responsibility for me, then why do
you exercise authority over me, command me, and order me
around. If I'm independent and free, and just as equal as
you, why do you assume a hierarchy over and above me?
How did it feel when you began to think I was in charge,
14and not you.
Bartleby is evicted from the old rooms and " 'persists in
haunting the building generally, sitting upon the banisters
of the stairs by day, and sleeping in the entry by night' "
(40), in effect, homeless. On being informed of Bartleby's
plight, the lawyer decides to go visit him though he insists
"that Bartleby was nothing to me-no more than to any one
else" (40). What follows is one of the funniest scenes in all of
Melville, though it is also terribly poignant. It begins with
the lawyer scolding Bartleby the way a parent might chas-
tise a child (in a dependent relationship), " 'Bartleby ... are
Bartleby's employer does not preside over apprentices, bound to him
by learning a craft. He is master over a refractory slave, who first
copies him "mechanically" and then withdraws his labor. Bartleby
could imitate the lawyer forever without acquiring either his
employer's competence or his status. The "degraded ... drill" of the
unskilled worker, the drill in which Bartleby engages, is "sealed off
from experience; practice counts for nothing there." Bartleby's "I have
given up copying" speaks to the changing character of work, the
growing distance between master and employee, and the chasm
separating imitation from maturity.
ROGIN, supra note 44, at 194-95.
94.
If an individual has much power over others, which means that they
are obligated to and dependent on him for greatly needed benefits, they
will be eager to do his bidding and anticipate his wishes in order to
maintain his good will, particularly if there are still others who
compete for the benefits he supplies them. If an individual has little
power over others, however, they will be less concerned with pleasing
him, and he may even have to remind them that they owe it to him to
follow his requests. Such reminders demonstrate to them that he really
needs the services they render him, just as they need his services,
which implies that the relation between him and them is not one of
unequal power but one of egalitarian exchange.
BLAU, supra note 78, at 134-35 (footnote omitted).
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you aware that you are the cause of great tribulation to
me ... ?'" (40).
"Now one of two things must take place. Either you must do
something, or something must be done to you. Now what sort of
business would you like to engage in? Would you like to re-engage
in copying for some one?"
"No; I would prefer not to make any change."
"Would you like a clerkship in a dry-goods store?"
"There is too much confinement about that. No, I would not like
a clerkship; but I am not particular."
"Too much confinement," I cried, "why you keep yourself
confined all the time!"
"I would prefer not to take a clerkship," he rejoined, as if to
settle that little item at once.
"How would a bar-tender's business suit you? There is no trying
of the eye-sight in that."
"I would not like it at all; though, as I said before, I am not
particular."
His unwonted wordiness inspirited me. I returned to the charge.
"Well, then, would you like to travel through the country
collecting bills for the merchants? That would improve your
health."
"No, I would prefer to be doing something else."
"How, then, would going as a companion to Europe, to entertain
some young gentleman with your conversation,-how would that
suit you?"
"Not at all. It does not strike me that there is anything definite
about that. I like to be stationary. But I am not particular" (41).
Rarely in literature have two people so thoroughly
failed to connect on any level, or has one person, earnestly
well intentioned, so failed to understand another. To sug-
gest that Bartleby might be a suitable candidate for
companionship or conversation because he has been so lo-
quacious and disarming until now, borders on the antic.
And yet the lack of understanding runs deeper. What
Bartleby seems to be trying to say is that it is not the type
of any particular form of work that he objects to, but the
nature of the employment relationship itself as presently
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constituted.95  Unless it is differently organized, says
Bartleby, I'm not particular. I just prefer not to do it. Do not
deny my equality, individuality, and independence while
you are in the process of assuring me we are all on the same
footing.96
The lawyer's final gesture is to ask Bartleby to come
home with him, one more heartfelt act of benevolence and
charity. Though the lawyer is not technically "responsible"
for Bartleby, though he is not even employing him any
more, he feels that he must care for him. So his offer is to
renew the old ties that might have followed from living to-
gether under one roof as masters and servants once
generally did. No longer bound together with Bartleby,
ironically, the lawyer now seeks to take Bartleby into his
home; while once he employed him, he had no idea at first
that Bartleby was actually living or making his home in the
95. Or as Kuebrich puts it:
Bartleby declines all of these offers and so his complaint seems to be
more fundamental than mere personal preference. Three times
Bartleby simply states: "I am not particular." Melville spins a pun on
the adjective. On the one hand, Bartleby is saying that he is not
particular, or "choosey," about the work he does; his dissatisfaction is
not with the work environment or the nature of the work but with the
employer-employee relationship. In terms of the inherent inequality of
the workplace, his experience in the law office is typical; he would be
no happier in any other job that also relegated him to a position of
servitude. On the other hand, by stressing that he is not "particular,"
Bartleby is also asserting that he is not "unique" but a member of a
class: dependent, wage-earning employees. Thus his dissatisfaction is
not directed specifically at the lawyer and would not be resolved by his
personally finding a more comfortable position.
David Kuebrich, Melville's Doctrine of Assumptions: The Hidden Ideology of
Capitalist Production in Bartleby, 69 NEw ENG. Q. 381, 400 (1996).
96.
The lawyer is also blind to the fact that the hierarchical distribution of
labor in his office, which relegates the clerks to copying his documents
and promptly performing his behests, is a social construct deriving
from an economic system that invests employers with virtually
unlimited power over their wage-dependent employees. Instead, he
identifies his authority with the natural order; thus Bartleby's refusals
strike him not as acts of resistance to an unjust and humiliating
subordination but as "violently unreasonable," whereas his own
behavior is "perfectly reasonable."
Id. at 393 (footnotes omitted).
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workplace. Bartleby, of course, prefers not to go home with
the lawyer. Frustrated, the lawyer leaves.
A short time later, the lawyer learns that the landlord
and tenants in the old building had Bartleby removed by
the police and taken to prison at the Tombs." The lawyer
almost immediately goes to visit Bartleby in prison. He pre-
vails upon a prison official to let Bartleby have "as indul-
gent confinement as possible" (42) because it is obvious that
he is no threat. He finds that Bartleby had been"permitted... freely to wander about the prison" (43), and
the lawyer seems unaware of the anomaly of allowing a
prisoner to be free to wander, while he had been walled in,
and in a sense, imprisoned in an office that he voluntarily
entered. In a final act of charity, the lawyer arranges and
pays for Bartleby to have his prison food supplemented by a
grub-man. The grub-man, on being introduced to Bartleby,
addresses Bartleby as " '[y]our sarvant, sir, your sarvant,' "
(44), ironically reflecting years of status and place. Submis-
sive by custom, the grub-man makes "a low salutation
behind his apron" (44). The lawyer does not seem to notice
that he was providing extra rations for a man starving in
more than one way.
Bartleby is not pleased to see the lawyer. " 'I want
nothing to say to you'" (43). He says he knows " 'where I
am' " (43), and the lawyer reacts, perhaps out of guilt, as if
Bartleby holds him responsible for his current plight. When
97. Bartleby's removal is made possible by his status as a propertyless
person and is reminiscent of Robert Hale's analysis of the coercion inherent in
economic relationships. Hale's statement of the problem highlights Bartleby's
plight and his susceptibility to legal process:
Unless... the non-owner can produce his own food, the law compels
him to starve if he has no wages, and compels him to go without wages
unless he obeys the behests of some employer. It is the law that coerces
him into wage-work under penalty of starvation-unless he can
produce food. Can he? Here again there is no law to prevent the
production of food in the abstract; but in every settled country there is
a law which forbids him to cultivate any particular piece of ground
unless he happens to be an owner. This again is the law of property.
And this again will not be likely to be lifted unless he already has
money. That way of escape from the law-made dilemma of starvation or
obedience is closed to him.
Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,




the lawyer returns to visit a few days later, he finds
Bartleby in the prison yard, dead, curled up in a fetal posi-
tion, probably having starved to death.
The lawyer ends his narration by repeating a rumor,
perhaps to provide some clues to the mysterious life of
Bartleby-a snippet of biography and context. "The report
was this: that Bartleby had been a subordinate clerk in the
Dead Letter Office at Washington, from which he had been
suddenly removed by a change in the administration" (45).
On one level losing a job is emblematic of the feature of
equality in the employment relationship-one can be fired
at any time, particularly from a political position. No
guarantees-free to enter, free to leave, or to be removed. A
measure of equality, as well as a form of dependency-on
your job and on those who have power to dismiss you. But
there is also a deeper symbol involved in the Dead Letters
themselves-" [a] pallid hopelessness" (45) in the spectre of
undelivered letters. A world of communications and rela-
tionships not connecting, and forever unfulfilled, akin to a
job that is unpromising and empty. The Dead Letter Office
stands as a metaphor for alienation, something that has
seized Bartleby's work, his employment relationship, and
his soul.
Bartleby will not accept that the form of his employ-
ment status is free, voluntary or natural, while its content
or substance is imposed: and hierarchical. He implicitly
denies, indeed defies, the authority of law to recognize, or
validate a hierarchy that particularly lends itself to a de-
pendency without mutual obligation. And so the story ends
with one of the most famous concluding lines in American
literature-one of despair-"Ah, Bartleby! Ah humanity!"
(45)-a recognition that at the core we are all tied together
despite the fact that so many of our social practices, in-
cluding work, tend to pull us apart and differentiate each of
us from each other. The lawyer, perhaps even unwittingly
having contributed to the silencing of Bartleby, voices
Bartleby's lament without knowing it.
Both Bartleby and Babo demonstrate the power of the
subordinate over the master. They differ, however, in their
method of defiance: Bartleby is passive and withdrawn;
Babo is active and violent. The master in both stories is
permanently changed by the act of defiance, but in Bartleby
the master's enduring link to the subordinate is compas-
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sion; in Benito Cereno, it is horror. Both stories end with the
law manifesting itself powerfully: Bartleby evicted,
arrested, and incarcerated; Babo tried, convicted, and exe-
cuted. The law restores order over ambiguity and mystery,
and the defiant subordinate dies at the culmination of the
legal process. Melville returns to these themes decades




"Welkin-eyed" Billy Budd is the young "Handsome
Sailor" (44), charismatic and blessed with "natural regal-
ity." He was impressed in 1797 from the English merchant
ship the Rights-of-Man into the British Navy and placed
aboard a warship, the Bellipotent. Billy immediately
becomes proficient in his new position as a foretopman, is
well-liked by the crew-a simple, illiterate, somewhat naive
noble figure with only one apparent "defect," a propensity to
stutter when agitated.
Billy's fate, however, resides in the hands of the two
other main protagonists in the story. First, Claggart, the
vessel's master-at-arms, possessed with a strange attrac-
tion for Billy, and described by Melville as having a "mania
of an evil nature" (76). Claggart sets out to destroy Billy by
creating false evidence to make it appear that Billy is plan-
ning to participate in a mutiny. Shortly after an unsuccess-
ful chase of an enemy vessel, Claggart approaches the other
major character in the story, Captain Vere, to present Vere
with his accusation against Billy's loyalty.
Captain Vere was "a bachelor of forty or thereabouts"
who "always acquit[ed] himself as an officer mindful of the
welfare of his men, but never tolerating an infraction of dis-
cipline" (60). He is brave, thoroughly professional, pedantic
and bookish, modest, aristocratic, with a propensity for "a
certain dreaminess of mood," for which he was known as
98. All citations to passages from Billy Budd are from HERMAN MELVILLE,
BILLY BUDD, SAILOR (AN INSIDE NARRATIVE) (Harrison Hayford & Merton M.
Sealts, Jr. eds., Univ. of Chi. Press 1962). The page citations immediately follow
the quotations in the body of the text itself.
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"Starry Vere" (61). Vere's instinct upon hearing Claggart's
charges against Billy is to be dismissive. He is incredulous
and thinks the claim absurd. In fact, Vere seems quite
angry at Claggart. Yet Vere is also aware that the charge is
serious in light of the recent British naval mutiny experi-
ences at Spithead and Nore. In an excess of caution, there-
fore, he has Billy summoned so that Claggart will be forced
to confront Billy in private, and Billy can defend himself.
When Claggart accuses Billy, however, Billy is so outraged
that his stuttering prevents him from answering the charge
verbally. Instead he reflexively strikes out, hitting Claggart
on the forehead and killing him. Shortly thereafter, Vere
declares: " 'Struck dead by an angel of God! Yet the angel
must hang!' " (101). He then convenes a drumhead court-
martial to try Billy not for mutiny, but for the capital
offense of striking a superior officer.
During the court martial, Vere fulfills a variety of roles
arguably in conflict: witness, prosecutor, judge, and-often
overlooked-defense counsel. Some ship's officers, serving
as members of the drumhead court, are reluctant to convict
and are willing to entertain thoughts of mitigating the sen-
tence. Vere, sensing their sympathy for Billy and his plight,
argues for the full measure of the law. The court ultimately
follows Vere's advice. Billy is hanged. His final words are
"God bless Captain Vere!" (123). Vere has the crew return
to their routine immediately. He is fearful that, disgruntled
by Billy's execution, they might become disobedient. The
ship is then engaged in battle and Vere is wounded, dying
shortly thereafter. His final words are "Billy Budd, Billy
Budd" (129). The official naval account of the episode casts
Claggart as the hero and victim, and Billy as the mutinous,
depraved criminal.
B. History
Melville had been working on the manuscript of Billy
Budd for a number of years prior to his death in 1891. (The
story was not published until 1924.) The late 1880s
witnessed renewed interest in an event nearly a half-
century old that resonated deeply within the Melville fam-
ily. In 1888 and 1889, two articles in the new popular
magazines of the era raised issues surrounding the so-
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called Somers mutiny of 1842,99 a case in which one of the
most prominent figures was Guert Gansevoort, Melville's
first cousin.
Alexander Slidell Mackenzie commanded the United
States Navy brig Somers, and he presided over the hanging
at sea of three members of his crew for allegedly plotting a
mutiny. One of those executed was an eighteen-year-old
midshipman, Philip Spencer, who also was the son of John
C. Spencer, Secretary of War in President Tyler's cabinet.
Contemporary reaction to the summary exercise of military
justice at sea while close to port and to civilian notice was
widespread, animated, ideological, and political. MacKenzie
was attacked and defended, and Spencer attempted to have
the captain tried for the murder of his son.
Guert Gansevoort had been a first lieutenant under
MacKenzie's command. It was to Guert that the original
apprehension of a possible mutiny had been reported, a
report he promptly relayed to MacKenzie. MacKenzie had
Guert watch Spencer for any suspicious activity and finally
directed Guert and fellow officers to convene a drumhead
court-martial. Guert participated in the gathering and
evaluation of testimony and in the guilty verdict-a verdict
MacKenzie apparently was anxious to receive. Whether
Spencer was a bored or spoiled adolescent, engaging in pi-
rate fantasies-in other words, whether the "alleged"
mutiny was hardly imminent; or whether MacKenzie acted
precipitously in peacetime without due regard for appropri-
ate procedure; or whether he prejudged the outcome, were
all issues widely, publicly aired. Indeed, Charles Sumner
wrote in MacKenzie's defense; James Fenimore Cooper
criticized his conduct. 100
99. ROGIN, supra note 44, at 295; SEALTS, supra note 15, at 50.
100. For a summary and treatment of the events, primarily through the
reproduction of the historical documents, see PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAVAL COURT
MARTIAL IN THE CASE OF ALEXANDER SLIDELL MACKENZIE (1844) 3-9 (Hugh Egan
ed., 1992); THE SOMERS MUTINY AFFAIR (Harrison Hayford ed., 1959). See also
BUCKNER F. MELTON, A HANGING OFFENSE: THE STRANGE AFFAIR OF THE
WARSHIP SOMERS (2003). For the exact circumstance when Melville first learned
of the event in 1843, see LAURIE ROBERTSON-LORANT, MELVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY
120-21 (1996); 1 HERSHEL PARKER, HERMAN MELVILLE: A BIOGRAPHY, 1819-1851,
at 241-42 (1996). Many scholars have commented on the possible impact of the
Somers on the writing of Billy Budd. See, e.g., ROGIN, supra note 44, at 294-316;
THOMAS, supra note 29, at 206-14.
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It is not certain that Melville directly used the Somers
affair as a model for Billy Budd.'01 Nevertheless, Melville
invites us to speculate about the impact the Somers events
had on him. Not once, but twice, in his fiction he recurs
directly to the Somers. In 1850 in White Jacket, Melville
suggested that "[t]he letter of the [law] was not altogether
observed," when "[t]hree men in time of peace, were...
hung... merely because, in the Captain's judgment, it
became necessary to hang them. To this day the question of
their complete guilt is socially discussed."02. Nearly half a
century after White Jacket, the most direct comparison to
the Somers comes in Billy Budd upon conclusion of the
court-martial deliberations:
Not unlikely they were brought to something more or less akin
to that harassed frame of mind which in the year 1842 actuated
the commander of the U.S. brig-of-war Somers to resolve, under
the so-called Articles of War, Articles modeled upon the English
Mutiny Act, to resolve upon the execution at sea of a midshipman
and two sailors as mutineers designing the seizure of the brig.
Which resolution was carried out though in a time of peace and
within not many days' sail of home. An act vindicated by a naval
court of inquiry subsequently convened ashore. History, and here
cited without comment. True, the circumstances on board the
Somers were different from those on board the Bellipotent. But the
urgency felt, well-warranted or otherwise, was much the same
(113-14).
The impact of the Somers incident on Guert, however,
was immediate and palpable. He began to develop a serious
drinking problem that led to controversial and unfortunate
101. For the discussion of the evidence and a skeptical evaluation, see
SEALTS, supra note 15, at 27-30, 181-83. Laurie Robertson-Lorant describes
Billy Budd as
a novella loosely based on the Somers mutiny.
The novella is not "about" the Somers mutiny, however. It springs
from profound meditations on moral and philosophical issues
occasioned by historical events. Its main characters are nothing like
the actual participants in the incident; they are representative figures
in the struggle between good and evil which Melville has given "a local
habitation and a name."
ROBERTSON-LORANT, supra note 100, at 585.
102. HERMAN MELVILLE, White Jacket or the World in a Man-of-War, in 5
THE WRITINGS OF HERMAN MELVILLE 3, 303 (Harrison Hayford et al. eds., 1970).
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naval commands, for which he underwent courts-martial of
his own."0 3 Guert apparently was haunted until his death by
his role in the Somers proceedings.
In addition to the Somers incident, some scholars have
suggested that the themes examined in Billy Budd also
may have been triggered by a particular contemporary epi-
sode, the Haymarket affair in Chicago in 1886, and the
subsequent legal proceedings.' Others have argued that
late-nineteenth-century debates about capital punishment
are reflected in the story.0 5 Finally, again we ought not to
forget the figure of Lemuel Shaw, lQoming over Melville's
shoulder (or perhaps, more accurately, vice versa).0 6 Could
Melville be commenting on Shaw's handling of the fugitive
slave cases? Is Billy Budd a reaction to, or an insight into,
the moral dilemmas of judging? Or is it about the positions
that judges are placed in by a demanding society, a society
that requires that law, perhaps occasionally on behalf of
society, address, if not remedy, its most pressing and
perplexing problems? Whatever the sources, Melville made
the tale uniquely his own.
C. Law
Billy Budd's fate is altered from the moment he is
seized from the "homeward-bound English merchantmen,"
Rights-of-Man,"° and impressed into the British navy on
103. On his drinking, see 1 PARKER, supra note 100, at 297. On his
subsequent naval career, see ROGIN, supra note 44, at 297.
104. See Robert K. Wallace, Billy Budd and the Haymarket Hangings, 47
AM. LITERATURE 108 (1975); WEINSTEIN, supra note 68, at 117-18.
105. For a perceptive reading along those lines, see H. Bruce Franklin, Billy
Budd and Capital Punishment: A Tale of Three Centuries, 69 AM. LITERATURE
337 (1997).
106. See generally COVER, supra note 32. See also THOMAS, supra note 29, at
201-06.
107. We tend to forget how significant a factor in economic development was
the eighteenth-century Anglo-American mercantile trade economy and that
sailors were a type of precursor to an industrial, free labor force. See MARCUS
REDIKER, BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA: MERCHANT SEAMEN,
PIRATES, AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN MARITIME WORLD, 1700-1750, at 8 (1987).
Indeed, "[tihe seaman was central to the changing history and political economy
of the North Atlantic world." Id. at 10. The legal relations of the merchant
seaman, as well as the naval world, mattered.
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the warship, the Bellipotent.1 °8 Billy, the "Handsome Sailor,"
and clearly the best choice from the merchant ship's crew,"made no demur," indeed his captain notes his"uncomplaining acquiescence, all but cheerful" (44-45).
As Billy is being transferred to the Bellipotent from the
merchant ship, "the new recruit jumped up" and made "a
salutation as to the ship herself, 'And good-bye to you too,
old Rights-of-Man' " (49). Melville's metaphor for the loss of
freedom, of course, is unmistakable, from Billy's salute to
the rights of man generally, to Melville's recognition that
Billy is losing those rights, to Melville's acknowledgment of
Thomas Paine's book of the same title (a "rejoinder to
Burke's arraignment of the French Revolution") (48).
The lieutenant seizing Billy reacts: " 'Down sir!' " he"roared... instantly assuming all the rigor of his rank," for
he "rather took [Billy's salutation] as meant to convey a
covert sally on the new recruit's part, a sly slur at impress-
ment in general. . ." (49). It quickly becomes apparent,
however, that Billy, "though happily endowed with the
gaiety of high health, youth, and a free heart, was yet by no
means of a satirical turn. The will to it and the sinister dex-
terity were alike wanting. To deal in double meanings and
insinuations of any sort was quite foreign to his nature"
108.
[I]mpressment may be described as a principle of compulsion. It
functions as a constraining force in the service of a ruling power,
providing the means whereby a dominant group implements its
sovereignty .... From this perspective, the object of impressment is
the production of obedient and disciplined subjects.
The legal justifications for impressment stressed the precedence of
either royal prerogative or public good over private right. So while
Englishmen generally celebrated the liberality of their nation, the
freedom of which was in some ways based on the absence of a standing
army, proponents of the press gang pointed to that absence as a
legitimating factor in support of impressment. In a land that prided
itself in its liberal freedom, gangs of recruiters roved the streets of
every town, tricking and kidnapping, plying with wine and
imprisoning, punching and compelling whole groups of unwilling men
to serve in His Majesty's navy.
Jeff Westover, The Impressments of Billy Budd, 39 MAss. REV. 361, 362, 363
(Autumn 1998).
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(49). All he meant to do was actually say goodbye to his
friends and ship.
And "as to his enforced enlistment, that he seemed to
take pretty much as he was want to take any vicissitude of
weather. Like the animals, though no philosopher, he was,
without knowing it, practically a fatalist" (49)."°' Though
Billy may have "rather liked this adventurous turn in his
affairs" (49), he also may have accepted it willingly because
in some ways it really was not a change in his position or
status. He was simply being moved from one ship to
another, from one command structure to another, from one
readily recognized hierarchical situation to another. On the
surface it did not seem to matter, and he apparently was
resigned to it. But Melville reminds us that not all accept
their new service. Though Billy "was soon at home in the
service," he thus stood "in marked contrast to certain other
individuals included like himself among the impressed por-
tion of the ship's company; for these when not actively
employed were sometimes, and more particularly in the last
dogwatch ... apt to fall into a saddish mood which in some
partook of sullenness" (49-50).
In a short compass, Melville has effectively set the
scene against which this story will be played. In part, the
central themes have to do with the ambiguity of freedom
and revolution. Impressed sailors in 1797 have lost their
liberty, certainly they were no longer in voluntary service,
ostensibly because their country needs them to defend itself
against a foreign power animated by the French Revolution,
a power that threatens to spread its ideas and actions to
inhibit and perhaps overthrow England's own concept of
freedom. Social and political chaos may result.
There is also, however, an internal risk in the Navy
because of the "sullenness" of those impressed. England in
April and May of 1797 witnessed two naval mutinies at
Spithead and Nore, caused in part by the reactions of men
impressed into service. "It was indeed," Melville tells us, "a
demonstration more menacing to England than the
contemporary manifestoes and conquering and proselyting
armies of the French Directory. To the British Empire the
109. "In part Billy represents the willing consent that defines hegemony."
ROBERT SHULMAN, SOCIAL CRITICISM & NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN
FICTIONS 75 (1987). Of course, Bartleby, by contrast, seems the mirror image.
2004] 1251
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Nore Mutiny was what a strike in the fire brigade would be
to London threatened by general arson" (54). And so, Billy
was put on board a ship whose officers were keenly aware of
recent history and current risks. Everyone, except perhaps
Billy, has a certain nervous apprehension or "anxiety."
Billy integrates himself successfully with his new
crewmates, "well received in the top and on the gun decks"
(50). He was, however, an abandoned orphan, "a foundling,
a presumable by-blow, and, evidently, no ignoble one. Noble
descent was as evident in him as in a blood horse" (52).
Though illiterate, "he possessed that kind and degree of
intelligence going along with the unconventional rectitude
of a sound human creature, one to whom not yet has been
proffered the questionable apple of knowledge" (52). He was
"in many respects.., little more than a sort of upright bar-
barian, much such perhaps as Adam presumably might
have been ere the urbane Serpent wriggled himself into his
company" (52). Billy had "just one thing amiss in him," a
tendency to stutter when "under sudden provocation of
strong heart-feeling" (53). All in all not a portrait of a sailor
likely to participate in a mutiny.
In any event, one of Billy's shipmates, the master-at-
arms, John Claggart, did not share the crew's reception of
the "Handsome Sailor." Claggart, whose origin and life
remained mysterious, apparently had a shady past, over-
looked by a navy anxious for able-bodied hands. His
enlistment was an example of the navy's official "sanctioned
irregularities" policy (66). His rise to a position of authority
stemmed from "[tihe superior capacity he immediately
evinced, his constitutional sobriety, an ingratiating defer-
ence to superiors.. ." (67). As a result, Claggart com-
manded a police force on board, his "immediate subordi-
nates, and compliant ones," the ears and eyes of the ship
(67).
Early in his warship's service, Billy saw the conse-
quences of a failure to comply with official duty, "[t]he first
formal gangway-punishment he had ever witnessed" (68).11 °
110. Melville often witnessed flogging during his own sea duty. "The
mindless cruelty of navy discipline enraged him, and he began to see flogging as
an apt metaphor for the relationship between tyrannical abuse of power and the
rights of the common man." ROBERTSON-LORANT, supra note 100, at 119. In
White Jacket, Melville made a particular point of emphasizing flogging practices
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The flogging "horrified" him, and "he resolved that never
through remissness would he make himself liable to such a
visitation or do or omit aught that might merit even verbal
reproof' (68).111 He is somewhat perplexed, therefore, when
he "found himself getting into petty trouble" (68), under the
watchful eyes of Claggart's police force. Billy seeks the
counsel of an old and wise seaman, Dansker, who "in a vein
of dry humor, or what not," or "whether in freak of patriar-
chal irony touching Billy's youth and athletic frame...
from the first in addressing him he always substituted Baby
for Billy. . ." (70). Sensing that Billy's child-like innocence
needs protecting, Dansker warns Billy that Claggart bears
Billy a certain animosity. At first Billy rejects Dansker's
admonition, but he soon becomes disturbed by it. As for
in the navy as the epitome of the injustice of hierarchical relations, an injustice
that might justify mutiny.
If there are any three things opposed to the genius of the American
Constitution, they are these: irresponsibility in a judge, unlimited
discretionary authority in an executive, and the union of an
irresponsible judge and an unlimited executive in one person.
Certainly the necessities of navies warrant a code for its government
more stringent than the law that governs the land; but that code
should conform to the spirit of the political institutions of the country
that ordains it. It should not convert into slaves some of the citizens of
a nation of freemen.
... [E]very American man-of-war's-man would be morally justified in
resisting the scourge to the uttermost; and, in so resisting, would be
religiously justified in what would be judicially styled "the act of
mutiny" itself.
MELVILLE, supra note 102, at 143, 144, 145. Michael Rogin makes the point that
"Melville marked the chapter in White-Jacket titled 'The Flogging' while
writing Billy Budd, for the scourge was a portent of Billy's doom." ROGIN, supra
note 44, at 305.
111.
In fact, the narrator's choice of the religious term visitation to
describe this common naval punishment assimilates military to divine
discipline, oddly or ironically "naturalizing" its perceived justice; Billy
experiences such punishment as divinely sanctioned and therefore not
open to question. The punishment forges its own legitimacy, not merely
out of simple fear, but from the psychology it theatrically institutes: if
such punishment is inflicted, the authority which inflicts it must not
only be impressively potent but also unimpeachably legitimate.
Westover, supra note 108, at 373 (footnote omitted).
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Dansker, 'Years, and those experiences which befall certain
shrewder men subordinated lifelong to the will of superiors,
all this had developed" within him a "pithy guarded cyni-
cism" (71). Billy may have been welcomed by the crew, but
Dansker understands that, in the shipboard world of
hierarchy and abuse of authority, Billy needs protection,
because he will not get it from any of the officers.
Claggart immediately shows overt evidence of his ani-
mosity towards Billy in the soup spilling incident, an epi-
sode that Billy misinterprets despite Dansker's warning.
Billy spills his soup during mess as Claggart walks by.
Claggart "was proceeding on his way without comment...
when he happened to observe who it was that had done the
spilling" (72). He playfully "tap[s]" Billy "from behind with
his rattan," and says, " 'Handsomely done, my lad! And
handsome is as handsome did it, too!' " (72). Billy does not
notice the grimace "that accompanied Claggart's equivocal
words" (72). The crew, however, "taking his remark as
meant for humorous, and at which therefore as coming from
a superior they were bound to laugh 'with counterfeited
glee' acted accordingly" (72). Billy joins in the glee, not
identifying Claggart's antipathy, and not understanding
that his shipmates are laughing out of deference to an offi-
cer.
Claggart then transfers his rage to a drummer-boy"chancing to come into light collision with his person,...
impetuously giving him a sharp cut with the rattan,...
vehemently exclaim[ing], 'Look where you go!' " (73). Billy
does not quite grasp what the shipmates with their false
deferential "glee" express. The drummer boy, who painfully
experiences instant discipline, understands: Billy is subject
to the arbitrary will of a superior in a hierarchical
relationship. Dansker knows it; Billy will have to learn its
shape and content.
But, Melville asks us, "What was the matter with the
master-at-arms?" (73). Melville suggests that Claggart
suffers from a "Natural Depravity," defined by Plato as "a
depravity according to nature" (75). This depravity
[p]artakes nothing of the sordid or sensual. It is serious, but free
from acerbity. Though no flatterer of mankind it never speaks ill
of it.
But the thing which in eminent instances signalizes so excep-
tional a nature is this: Though the man's even temper and discreet
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bearing would seem to intimate a mind peculiarly subject to the
law of reason, not the less in heart he would seem to riot in
complete exemption from that law, having apparently little to do
with reason further than to employ it as an ambidexter implement
for effecting the irrational. That is to say: Toward the
accomplishment of an aim which in wantonness of atrocity would
seem to partake of the insane, he will direct a cool judgment
sagacious and sound. These men are madmen, and of the most
dangerous sort, for their lunacy is not continuous, but occasional,
evoked by some special object; it is protectively secretive, which is
as much as to say it is self-contained, so that when, moreover,
most active it is to the average mind not distinguishable from
sanity... (76).
Claggart's illness is thus dangerous because he is aware of
it and attempts to keep it from public view and suspicion.
But what activates Claggart's "mania" about Billy?
Melville suggests it is "envy" (77). Perhaps, it is homoerotic
envy. Melville informs us that Claggart's envy "was no
vulgar form of the passion," but "Claggart's envy struck
deeper" (77-78).
If askance he eyed the good looks, cheery health, and frank
enjoyment of young life in Billy Budd, it was because these went
along with a nature that, as Claggart magnetically felt, had in its
simplicity never willed malice or experienced the reactionary bite
of that serpent. To him, the spirit lodged within Billy, and looking
out from his welkin eyes as from windows, that ineffability it was
which made the dimple in his dyed cheek, suppled his joints, and
dancing in his yellow curls made him preeminently the Handsome
Sailor. One person excepted, the master-at-arms was perhaps the
only man in the ship intellectually capable of adequately
appreciating the moral phenomenon presented in Billy Budd. And
the insight but intensified his passion, which assuming various
secret forms within him, at times assumed that of cynic disdain,
disdain of innocence-to be nothing more than innocent! Yet in an
aesthetic way he saw the charm of it, the courageous free-and-easy
temper of it, and fain would have shared it, but he despaired of it
(78).
Billy has what Claggart knows he does not and cannot ever
have. Billy enjoys naturally won admiration of everyone
with whom he comes in contact. Claggart is repelled by
Billy's successful and superior fraternal position and grace,
and so Claggart sets out, using his superior legal position of
authority, to destroy Billy.
Claggart attempts to effect his plan by having his police
corporals harass Billy in a petty fashion and inform on him.
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His subordinates misrepresent and falsify information,
particularly about what Billy supposedly is saying about
Claggart. Not satisfied with this, Claggart apparently has a
member of his staff attempt to recruit Billy into joining a
fictitious mutiny. Billy is outraged, and cuts off the conver-
sation. But he does not report it as he should have done. He
does not want to be a "telltale" (85).
In certain matters, some sailors even in mature life remain
unsophisticated enough. But a young seafarer of the disposition of
our athletic foretopman is much of a child-man. And yet a child's
utter innocence is but its blank ignorance, and the innocence more
or less wanes as intelligence waxes. But in Billy Budd intelligence,
such as it was, had advanced while yet his simple-mindedness
remained for the most part unaffected (86).
Billy's childlike innocence leaves him vulnerable, and
Claggart intuits that no one in authority will look after him.
Moreover, Billy's immersion into the customary life of a
sailor leaves him unprepared for Claggart's machinations.
Yes, as a class, sailors are in character a juvenile race. Even
their deviations are marked by juvenility, this more especially
holding true with the sailors of Billy's time. Then too, certain
things which apply to all sailors do more pointedly operate here
and there upon the junior one. Every sailor, too, is accustomed to
obey orders without debating them; his life afloat is externally
ruled for him; he is not brought into the promiscuous commerce
with mankind where unobstructed free agency on equal terms-
equal superficially, at least-soon teaches one that unless upon
occasion he exercise a distrust keen in proportion to the fairness of
the appearance, some foul turn may be served him. A ruled
undemonstrative distrustfulness is so habitual, not with
businessmen so much as with men who know their kind in less
shallow relations than business, namely, certain men of the world,
that they come at last to employ it all but unconsciously; and some
of them would very likely feel real surprise at being charged with
it as one of their general characteristics (87).
Sailors "accustomed to obey orders" simply do what they are
told. They are in an inferior position; there is no pretense to
equality and fending for oneself in the marketplace.
Perhaps in positions of dependency they should be
protected; instead, Melville seems to suggest, they are
likely to be abused.
Claggart is now ready to spring his trap. After an
unsuccessful chase of an enemy vessel, Claggart approaches
Captain Vere with evidence of what he has learned during
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the pursuit, suspicion of a possible mutiny afoot. Vere is
dry, pedantic, stern, experienced, courageous, formal, a dis-
ciplinarian, and bookish.
In this line of reading he found confirmation of his own more
reserved thoughts-confirmation which he had vainly sought in
social converse, so that as touching most fundamental topics, there
had got to be established in him some positive convictions which
he forefelt would abide in him essentially unmodified so long as
his intelligent part remained unimpaired. In view of the troubled
period in which his lot was cast, this was well for him. His settled
convictions were as a dike against those invading waters of novel
opinion social, political, and otherwise, which carried away as in a
torrent no few minds in those days, minds by nature not inferior to
his own. While other members of that aristocracy to which by birth
he belonged were incensed at the innovators mainly because their
theories were inimical to the privileged classes, Captain Vere
disinterestedly opposed them not alone because they seemed to
him insusceptible of embodiment in lasting institutions, but at war
with the peace of the world and the true welfare of mankind (62-
63).
Vere is a man of convictions, not unlike the lawyer in
Bartleby, who was a man of assumptions.'
Claggart, attempting artfully to play a role, "[w]ith the
air of a subordinate grieved at the necessity of being a mes-
senger of ill tidings," slowly conveys his story (92). Vere
"with some impatience interrupt[s] him" and orders him to
"[ble direct" (92). "Claggart made a gesture of subservience,
and proceeded" (92). Claggart seems to count on Vere's
concerns about the Nore mutiny to engage his attention and
to force Vere to take his report seriously. When Claggart
finally reveals that Billy Budd is the focus of his suspicion,
Vere reacts with "unfeigned astonishment" (94); he simply
does not believe the information, even though he is sure in
the abstract that "prompt action should be taken at the first
palpable sign of recurring insubordination" (93).
Vere decides to summon Billy to face his accuser.
Claggart repeats his allegations to Billy. "Not at first did
Billy take it in. When he did,... [h]e stood like one impaled
and gagged" (98). Vere tells Billy" 'Speak, man!'... 'Speak!
Defend yourselfl'" (98). Vere's "appeal caused but a strange
dumb gesturing and gurgling in Billy; amazement at such
an accusation so suddenly sprung on inexperienced nonage"
(98). His reaction results in "a convulsed tongue-tie" (98).
Vere, "[tihough at the time.., quite ignorant of Billy's li-
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ability to vocal impediment,... now immediately divined
it. . ." (99). He urges Billy to compose himself and take his
time. "Contrary to the effect intended, these words so
fatherly in tone, doubtless touching Billy's heart to the
quick, prompted yet more violent efforts at utterance" (99).
Frustrated at his inability to express himself and refute the
lie, Billy strikes out at Claggart, hitting him on the fore-
head, and killing him instantly. Vere whispers, " 'Fated
boy'... 'what have you done!' " Immediately, Vere takes
charge: "The father in him, manifested towards Billy thus
far in the scene, was replaced by the military disciplinar-
ian" (100). Billy, stripped of patriarchal protection (because
of his youth and inexperience), and of his voice, now faces
military justice-an outcome perhaps prejudged by Vere
who exclaims to the ship's surgeon that Claggert was" 'struck dead by an angel of God! Yet the angel must hang!"'
(101).112
Vere convenes a drumhead court-martial to try Billy for
striking and killing Claggart, a superior officer. The sur-
geon expresses doubts to himself, as other officers do, about
whether Vere is following an appropriate procedure for
112. The combination of Billy's stutter and illiteracy coalesce into a
dependency that touches Vere momentarily as a parent or father might be
moved to protect a child or son. "Billy Budd's more serious impediment strikes
him dumb as an independent being .... Billy is ultimately received by his
aristocratic 'father' as sacrifice rather than heir." RADLOFF, supra note 52, at
212.
[But] Billy is a child of nature. He had independence on the merchant
ship, Rights-of-Man, from which he was impressed. But Billy's desire to
please Captain Vere deprives him of autonomy. The "fatherly" words
from Vere bring a "crucifixion" to Billy's face; he stutters in anxiety to
speak his innocence to the Captain. Billy is consciously submissive, but
critics have heard in his stutter an unconscious hostility to authority.
Billy stutters only when his loyalty is questioned, as if his tongue
withholds assent and prevents him from dissembling. Does the stutter
block anger he is not allowed to express? In American folk tales (long
before Freud) obstructed speech leads to frontier violence. Like the
proverbial backwoodsman, Billy chokes with rage and strikes his
accuser.
Both Billy's stutter and the blow from his fist are involuntary, for
Billy never even contemplates rebellion .... Billy's overidentification
with Vere progressively infantilizes him. He is reduced from
establishing order on the Rights to a stuttering protest of loyalty to
Vere.
ROGIN supra note 44, at 306-07 (citation omitted).
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trying Billy. Perhaps Billy should simply be confined, until
the ship "should rejoin the squadron, and then refer it to
the admiral" (101). The surgeon wonders whether Vere is"unhinged" (102), questioning professionally whether Vere's
sanity and judgment have been affected by the events, and
perhaps metaphorically whether his summary actions are"unhinged" from their legal foundation.
But assuming that he is [unhinged], it is not so susceptible of
proof. What then can the surgeon do? No more trying situation, is
conceivable than that of an officer subordinate under a captain
whom he suspects to be not mad, indeed, but yet not quite
unaffected in his intellects. To argue his order to him would be
insolence. To resist him would be mutiny (102).
The surgeon's subordinate role leads him to stifle his
intuition; his role takes precedence over his instinct that
something quite wrong, perhaps unjust, is about to occur.
Vere proceeds to trial, but Melville highlights Vere's
problem for us.
In the jugglery of circumstances preceding and attending the
event on board the Bellipotent, and in the light of that martial code
whereby it was formally to be judged, innocence and guilt
personified in Claggart and Budd in effect changed places. In a
legal view the apparent victim of the tragedy was he who had
sought to victimize a man blameless; and the indisputable deed of
the latter, navally regarded, constituted the most heinous of
military crimes. Yet more. The essential right and wrong involved
in the matter, the clearer that might be, so much the worse for the
responsibility of a loyal sea commander, inasmuch as he was not
authorized to determine the matter on that primitive basis (103).
The "jugglery of circumstances" has left Vere with a
profound moral dilemma. The world has been turned upside
down by the events precipitated by Claggart. Can Vere
right it? Should he be trying a man who he believes is
morally innocent, a man defending himself in the only way
he believed available, from an accusation that Vere thinks
is untrue? What justifies his prosecution? And how will
Billy defend himself now in light of what we have just
learned about his capacities?"3
113. "Billy Budd rivets attention on a conflict: Captain Vere's obedience to
formal rules and to his perceived duty contrasts sharply with the demands of
actual justice." Aviam Soifer, Status, Contract, and Promises Unkept, 96 YALE
L.J. 1916, 1954 (1987).
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The court-martial begins. Vere's roles, other than in a
summary military setting, obviously would be hopelessly in
conflict. He is the ultimate judge, he picks the jury (the first
lieutenant, the captain of marines, and the sailing master),
he is a testifying eyewitness, he is the prosecutor, and Billy
even appeals to him as defense counsel. Throughout Vere
insists on "reserving to himself, as the one on whom the
ultimate accountability would rest, the right of maintaining
a supervision of it, or formally or informally interposing at
need" (104). Vere does not intend to relinquish in any
measure his hierarchical control. Melville symbolizes this
for us when observing that even when appearing as a wit-
ness "and as such temporarily sinking his rank, though
singularly maintaining it in a matter apparently trivial,
namely, that he testified from the ship's weather side, with
that object having caused the court to sit on the lee side"
(105). The outcome has already been determined.
During the court-martial, Billy is asked a handful of
questions after Vere finishes testifying as the eyewitness.
The first lieutenant in effect asks Billy to corroborate Vere's
testimony. Billy vouches for Vere: " 'Captain Vere tells the
truth. It is just as Captain Vere says, but it is not as the
master-at-arms said. I have eaten the King's bread and I
am true to the King'" (106). Vere responds, "'I believe you,
my man,'. . his voice indicating a suppressed emotion not
otherwise betrayed" (106). When Billy is asked a final direct
question about what would have motivated Claggart to lie
and bear him malice, he has difficulty answering because it
relates to "a spiritual sphere wholly obscure to Billy's
thoughts" (107). He automatically turns to Vere for help,
"deeming him his best helper and friend" (107). Vere's an-
swer is the classic formalistic response.
"The question you put to him comes naturally enough. But how
can he rightly answer it?-or anybody else, unless indeed it be he
who lies within there," designating the compartment where lay the
corpse. "But the prone one there will not rise to our summons. In
effect, though, as it seems to me, the point you make is hardly
material. Quite aside from any conceivable motive actuating the
master-at-arms, and irrespective of the provocation to the blow, a
martial court must needs in the present case confine its attention
to the blow's consequence, which consequence justly is to be
deemed not otherwise than as the striker's deed" (107).
The analysis does Billy no good, in fact harms him, as Vere
insists that all the court need or even may consider is the
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consequences of the act, the objective outcome. Any inquiry
into the subjective morass of intent is to no avail. Billy's
behavior, not Claggart's state of mind, is all that is at issue.
Billy would like to believe that he can depend on Vere
for assistance, but he seems vaguely to understand that
what he just heard does not qualify as aid from a "helper."
This utterance, the full significance of which it was not at all
likely that Billy took in, nevertheless caused him to turn a wistful
interrogative look toward the speaker, a look in its dumb
expressiveness not unlike that which a dog of generous breed
might turn upon his master, seeking in his face some elucidation
of a previous gesture ambiguous to the canine intelligence (107-
08).
The officers think that Vere's response indicates "a
prejudgment on the speaker's part" (108). Given the rela-
tionship of captain and sailor, what should Billy (or the
officers) expect? To be protected (as a child)? He looks to
Vere to defend him, but Vere is caught in the duality of the
hierarchical relationship. On the one hand, he must assert
his hierarchical rank by prosecuting; on the other hand, he
might wish to protect those who are dependent on him. His
conflict, his divided role, comes from trying to work out the
fact that hierarchy and dependence or subordination may
pull him simultaneously in both ways in the relationship.
As a dog looking to his master, Billy makes one final
attempt to elicit Vere's aid. (We might remember that
Delano in Benito Cereno naively compares the faithfulness
of slaves to dogs.) He turns "another quick glance toward
Captain Vere; then, as taking a hint from that aspect, a
hint confirming his own instinct that silence was now
best. . ." (108), he chooses silence. Vere thinks Billy's
defense has lasted long enough. The court-martial con-
cludes shortly after a line of questioning is truncated,"overrulingly instructed by a glance from Captain Vere"
(108).
Vere assumes control of the deliberations once the
proceedings have concluded. He states the legal and moral
questions to focus the discussion:
"But your scruples: do they move as in a dusk? Challenge them.
Make them advance and declare themselves. Come now; do they
import something like this: If, mindless of palliating
circumstances, we are bound to regard the death of the master-at-
arms as the prisoner's deed, then does that deed constitute a
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capital crime whereof the penalty is a mortal one. But in natural
justice is nothing but the prisoner's overt act to be considered?
How can we adjudge to summary and shameful death a fellow
creature innocent before God, and whom we feel to be so?-Does
that state it aright? You sign sad assent. Well, I too feel that, the
full force of that. It is Nature. But do these buttons that we wear
attest that our allegiance is to Nature? No, to the King. Though
the ocean, which is inviolate Nature primeval, though this be the
element where we move and have our being as sailors, yet as the
King's officers lies our duty in a sphere correspondingly natural?"
(110).
Vere reminds the officers that they must obey
commands, including the command of law, and he issues a
passionate defense of role-differentiated morality:
"[I]n receiving our commissions we in the most important regards
ceased to be natural free agents. When war is declared are we the
commissioned fighters previously consulted? We fight at command.
If our judgments approve the war, that is but coincidence. So in
other particulars. So now. For suppose condemnation to follow
these present proceedings. Would it be so much we ourselves that
would condemn as it would be martial law operating through us?
For that law and the rigor of it, we are not responsible. Our vowed
responsibility is in this: That however pitilessly that law may
operate in any instances, we nevertheless adhere to it and
administer it" (110-11).
Vere also entertains and answers an officer's intelligent
and probing questions, at all times directing them towards
the result he approves.
"Can we not convict and yet mitigate the penalty?" asked the
sailing master, here speaking, and falteringly, for the first.
"Gentlemen, were that clearly lawful for us under the
circumstances, consider the consequences of such clemency" (112).
Finally, he plays his trump card-the necessity or
policy defense of his proposed verdict.
"The people" (meaning the ship's company) "have native sense;
most of them are familiar with our naval usage and tradition; and
how would they take it? Even could you explain to them-which
our official position forbids-they, long molded by arbitrary
discipline, have not that kind of intelligent responsiveness that
might qualify them to comprehend and discriminate. No, to the
people the foretopman's deed, however it be worded in the
announcement, will be plain homicide committed in a flagrant act
of mutiny. What penalty for that should follow, they know. But it
does not follow. Why? they will ruminate. You know what sailors
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are. Will they not revert to the recent outbreak at the Nore? Ay.
They know the well-founded alarm-the panic it struck
throughout England. Your clement sentence they would account
pusillanimous. They would think that we flinch, that we are afraid
of them-afraid of practicing a lawful rigor singularly demanded
at this juncture, lest it should provoke new troubles. What shame
to us such a conjecture on their part, and how deadly to discipline.
You see then, whither, prompted by duty and the law, I steadfastly
drive. But I beseech you, my friends, do not take me amiss. I feel
as you do for this unfortunate boy. But did he know our hearts, I
take him to be of that generous nature that he would feel even for
us on whom in this military necessity so heavy a compulsion is
laid" (112-13).114
Thus, in relationships of hierarchy and subordination, it is
a mistake at critical moments to reveal any weakness. The
sailors, the people, the masses (remember the specter of the
French Revolution) would willingly overthrow the whole
ordered set of social relationships with only a minimum of
encouragement. They must be dealt with rigorously. The
law helps us to support norms. Use it.
So Billy, innocent of mutiny, having engaged in an act
of a type of self-defense, must die to vindicate the greater
good. Otherwise, the threat to order is too great; the risk
not worth taking. He is found guilty and sentenced to
death. And Billy, of all people, seems to understand why he
114. It is important to see how authority is deployed.
One could ... argue that Vere needs an atmosphere of crisis to
sanction an authority structure natural to his own upper-class station.
This is not to deny that there are genuinely threatening circumstances
aboard the Bellipotent. It is only to say that these threats are entirely
class-inflected. There is probably no single image in the story that
more neatly captures these anxieties than the picture of the officers
during battle standing "with drawn swords behind the men working
the guns."
SusAN L. MIZRUCHI, THE SCIENCE OF SACRIFICE: AMERICAN LITERATURE AND
MODERN SOCIAL THEORY 144 (1998). Rogin cements the point:
Authority repossessed instinct on the Bellipotent. Uniforms and
rituals naturalized man-made institutions, placing them beyond
human reach. Men regained their location in nature. But this was not
the rights-granting nature of the Declaration of Independence, but a
nature in which they were assimilated to beasts. Frozen into forms to
protect against chaos, society conspired with nature in Billy Budd
against a human ground.
ROGIN, supra note 44, at 315.
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must be martyred. Vere "old enough to have been Billy's
father,... the austere devotee of military duty,... may in
end have caught Billy to his heart,'15 even as Abraham may
have caught young Isaac on the brink of resolutely offering
him up in obedience to the exacting behest" (115).116 Billy
responds and in an extraordinary gesture utters his final
words just before hanging:
"God bless Captain Vere!" Syllables so unanticipated coming from
one with the ignominious hemp about his neck-a conventional
felon's benediction directed aft towards the quarters of honor;
syllables too delivered in the clear melody of a singing bird on the
point of launching from the twig-had a phenomenal effect, not
unenhanced by the rare personal beauty of the young sailor,
spiritualized now through late experiences so poignantly profound
(123).
At that "penultimate moment" (123), Billy recognizes and
repeats for all, particularly the crew, the legitimacy of
Vere's superiority and authority.117 He accepts his rank and
115.
Paternalism predicates inferiority .... The tender though
sentimentalizing image of a child seeking adult protection both reveals
the pathos of the seamen's plight and the apparently inherent union
between administrative paternalism and proletarian illiteracy. Such
language asserts the hierarchy that informs the military, but it does so
by means of an ideology that posits military relations as familial; it
thereby mystifies the real quality of the relations it constitutes. Hence
Vere's paternal regard for Billy masks the fact that he acts from an
idiosyncratic interpretation of military requirements.
Westover, supra note 108, at 379 (footnotes omitted).
116. For a perceptive treatment of patriarchy and sacrifice, see MIZRUCHI,
supra note 114, at 179-80. "Captain Vere comes ultimately to represent the
generation of the fathers in its willingness to sacrifice its sons to authoritarian
patriarchial power." ROBERTSON-LORANT, supra note 100, at 589. "Instead of
speaking out against Captain Vere, Billy lets the fatherlike captain speak for
him. In doing so he entrusts his life to a man who sacrifices him in the name of
the law." THOMAS, supra note 29, at 221.
117. In the Somers mutiny case, seaman Elisha Small, shortly before his
hanging, reportedly uttered "God bless that flag." "Small's speech resonates for
readers of Billy Budd, which Melville was working on when he died; there he
used similar phrasing, which he labeled a conventional felon's benediction,
indicating that similar last words were commonly used by condemned men." 1
PARKER, supra note 100, at 242. The meaning of the blessing is complicated. Is
it true forgiveness? F. 0. Matthiessen argued long ago that "Vere obeys the law,
yet understands the deeper reality of the spirit. Billy instinctively accepts the
captain's duty, and forgives him." F.O. MATTHIESSEN, AMERICAN RENAISSANCE:
ART AND EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF EMERSON AND WHITMAN 511 (1941). On the
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its consequences. (Perhaps an earlier generation might see
it as a classic example of false consciousness or at least the
success of cultural hegemony). Vere at this tense moment is
grateful for all the help he can get. Billy at the bottom rung
of the ladder, having once sought Vere's assistance, now
provides him with the ultimate gift, his life.
Vere is not alone in being a prisoner of this ritual of
roles and subordination. Like the surgeon, the ship's
chaplain has doubts.
Marvel not that having been made acquainted with the young
sailor's essential innocence the worthy man lifted not a finger to
avert the doom of such a martyr to martial discipline. So to do
would not only have been as idle as invoking the desert, but would
also have been an audacious transgression of the bounds of his
function, one as exactly prescribed to him by military law as that
of the boatswain or any other naval officer. Bluntly put, a chaplain
is the minister of the Prince of Peace serving in the host of the God
of War-Mars. As such, he is as incongruous as a musket would be
on the altar at Christmas. Why, then, is he there? Because he
indirectly subserves the purpose attested by the cannon; because
too he lends the sanction of the religion of the meek to that which
practically is the abrogation of everything but brute Force (121-
22).
Billy's fate is sealed by those not accustomed to challenge
their place in the world. The officers on board are trapped
by deference to authority, and withdraw at crucial moments
from exercising independent judgment. And so "God bless
Captain Vere" is a tribute to and an expression of their
state of mind.
Vere does have something to worry about. Like a Greek
chorus, the crew had repeated Billy's benediction of the cap-
tain; but at the moment of Billy's execution, they fell silent.
The silence then turned to a murmur:
other hand, "[s]acrifice is about compliance. An ideal victim understands the
necessary equivalence between collective and individual propitiation .... From
this perspective, Billy Budd's blessing, on the point of death, of the sacrificial
beneficiary, Captain Vere, expresses neither acceptance nor irony. It merely
confirms sacrificial procedure." MIZRUCHI, supra note 114, at 163.
However,"[w]hat is conventional in [Billy's] benediction is opposed to sincere
speech, and is the mark of that instinct of docility which is second nature to the
sailor. Given that the naturally impassioned speech of Billy is a stutter, the
clarity of these words ... argues insincerity . . . ." RADLOFF, supra note 52, at
227. Was Billy's sincerity or insincerity more or less consistent with his
understanding of his legal or social standing aboard ship?
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The seeming remoteness of its source was because of its
murmurous indistinctness, since it came from close by, even from
the men massed on the ship's open deck. Being inarticulate, it was
dubious in significance further than it seemed to indicate some
capricious revulsion of thought or feeling such as mobs ashore are
liable to, in the present instance possibly implying a sullen
revocation on the men's part of their involuntary echoing of Billy's
benediction. But ere the murmur had time to wax into clamor it
was met by a strategic command, the more telling that it came
with abrupt unexpectedness: "Pipe down the starboard watch,
Boatswain, and see that they go" (126).
A variation of this scene was repeated during Billy's
burial at sea:
An uncertain movement began among them, in which some
encroachment was made. It was tolerated but for a moment. For
suddenly the drum beat to quarters, which familiar sound
happening at least twice every day, had upon the present occasion
a signal peremptoriness in it. True martial discipline long
continued superinduces in average man a sort of impulse whose
operation at the official word of command much resembles in its
promptitude the effect of an instinct.
... All this occupied time, which in the present case was the
object in beating to quarters at an hour prior to the customary one.
That such variance from usage was authorized by an officer like
Captain Vere, a martinet as some deemed him, was evidence of
the necessity for unusual action implied in what he deemed to be
temporarily the mood of his men: "With mankind," he would say,
"forms, measured forms, are everything; and this is the import
couched in the story of Orpheus with his lyre spellbinding the wild
denizens of the wood." And this he once applied to the disruption
of forms going on across the Channel and the consequences thereof
(127-28).
In each instance, Vere counts on the effect of orders and
command to restore the men to their appropriate and
expected roles, to shake them out of their contemplation
and evaluation of what has just transpired. The "measured
forms" are derived from the legal and social relationships
that govern the interactions between captain and crew.
Part of those forms incorporate the expectation of obedi-
ence, duty, and service. Vere assumes that the "measured
forms" will contain "the ragged edges" (128) of the truth.'18
118.
The most spectacular scene of discipline in all of Billy Budd occurs
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Shortly after Billy's execution, the Bellipotent falls into
battle against a French line-of-battle ship renamed the
Atheist in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Vere is
wounded in battle; his dying words shortly thereafter are
"Billy Budd, Billy Budd" (129). Though to all outward
appearances he appeared accepting of the outcome of the
trial, his last words leave the impression that he was
haunted to his own grave by Billy's death. He knew justice
had not been done. "War," like law, "looks but to the front-
age, the appearance" (112), and, therefore, the officially
authorized naval account of Billy ignores the truth with all
its ragged edges. The published chronicle records that
Claggart discovered "that some sort of plot was incipient
among an inferior section of the ship's company," and while"arraigning" Billy, "the ringleader," before the captain,
Claggart was stabbed to death by Billy (130). Billy is
described as "no Englishman, but one of those aliens
adopting English cognomens whom the present extraordi-
nary necessities of the service have caused to be admitted
into it in considerable numbers" (130) (in other words, a
description of Claggart, not Billy). Claggart, by contrast, is
described as "respectable and discreet" (130), what we
would expect of a petty officer, the heart of the fleet. Billy is
described as having " 'paid the penalty of his crime. The
promptitude of the punishment has proved salutary. Noth-
ing amiss is now apprehended aboard H.M.S. Bellipotent' "
(131). Lest we miss the lesson of the subjective and
suspicious nature of official and objective historical ac-
counts, as opposed to pure fiction, Melville tells us: "The
above, appearing in a publication now long ago superannu-
ated and forgotten, is all that hitherto has stood in human
record to attest what manner of men respectively were John
Claggart and Billy Budd" (131).
But Billy's legend grows among the sailors despite the
official version of the events. He takes on a Christ-like
quality as those who witnessed his death remember his
immediately after Billy's execution. Although the "ritual of power"
embodied by Billy's public hanging fails to subdue Vere's men, the
captain's recourse to rote regimen immediately after the hanging
succeeds .... Captain Vere's calculated reliance on the signaling
whistles and structured drumbeats of his officers exemplifies the
martial production of subjects amenable to the commands of the state.
Westover, supra note 108, at 374-75 (footnote omitted).
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benediction and blessing of his captain, almost as if he
forgave him; his hanging when "Billy ascended; and, as-
cending, took the full rose of the dawn" (124); and the fact
that
[tihe spar from which the foretopman was suspended was for some
few years kept trace of by the bluejackets. Their knowledges
followed it from ship to dockyard and again from dockyard to ship,
still pursing it even when at last reduced to a mere dockyard
boom. To them a chip of it was as a piece of the Cross (131).
The sailors "instinctively" know that Billy was falsely
accused, that he "was a sort of man as incapable of mutiny
as of wilful murder" (131). They care not at all that "the
penalty was somehow unavoidably inflicted from the naval
point of view." And so one of the sailors of an "artless poetic
temperament" (131) composes some lines in tribute to set
the record straight: "Billy in the Darbies."19 Billy in
preparing for death concludes, "But aren't it all a sham?"
(132). The sham is in the affectation of due process in
bringing Billy to his death.
As in the cases of Bartleby and Babo, law's voice and
accompanying mechanism concludes the story. The subor-
dinate dies or is killed. The power of the subordinate over
the master, however, lives on in the underground version of
the events. Unlike Babo's rebellion and Bartleby's passive
withdrawal, however, Billy's power is expressed by his
loyalty, submission, and saintliness. In fact, the common
sailors remain loyal to Billy and not to Vere nor to the
navy's version of the episode.
There has been substantial scholarly debate about
whether Captain Vere followed appropriate naval procedure
119.
[Tihe last word of Melville's book comes from a fictive subaltern. This
suggests that the narrator of Billy Budd sympathetically adopts the
perspective of that subordinate figure. The "ragged edges" of the poem,
like those of the novella itself, offer a homely portrait of a low-ranking
seaman with whom its audience of fellow sailors can readily identify.
The "messmate" of the ballad extends a cup to the condemned man in a
gesture of respect and solidarity. The ballad's final lines record a
request: "Just ease these darbies at the wrist." The chains that bind
the impressed man remain fixed even in death, but the poem envisions
a humane exchange even as it sentimentalizes the sea burial it
portrays.
Id. at 377 (footnote omitted).
1268 [Vol. 52
2004] MELVILLE AND AMERICAN LAW 1269
in trying Billy in the manner, time, and place he did. Rich-
ard Weisberg argues that Vere committed a number of
critical procedural errors that undermined the legitimacy of
the verdict, heightening the sense that a grave injustice
occurred. 2 ° Critics of varying political persuasions have
been critical of this view, ranging from Richard Posner 2 ' to
Brook Thomas.1
22
I do not wish to be drawn into this dispute other than to
say it seems to me that whether Vere was entitled to use
the procedures he did, or whether he had the discretion to
act differently, is only part of the point of the story. An
important question is what procedure derives from the legal
relationship within which Billy is embedded with his
commanding officer and the navy. Though it is a fair ques-
tion to ask whether or not Billy got the process he was
entitled to under whatever law governed, the more
important question is what was the legal regime governing
Billy designed to accomplish? Was it designed to vindicate
the authority of command and the state in cases of
necessity and peril (it is an interesting problem, as to who
120. See RICHARD H. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE
PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MODERN FICTION 147-59 (1984). See also C. B. Ives,
Billy Budd and the Articles of War, 34 AM. LITERATURE 31 (1962).
121. See Richard Posner, Comment on Richard Weisberg's Interpretation of
Billy Budd, 1 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 71, 73 (1989) ("Harsh, maybe
horrible, maybe unusual (as hinted by the surgeon, one of the members of the
court-martial)--yes. But illegal-no."); see also Richard Posner, From Billy
Budd to Buchenwald, 96 YALE L.J. 1173, 1183 (1987) (reviewing WEISBERG,
supra note 120).
122.
But the emphasis on procedural technicalities often diverts people from
questioning the assumptions of the entire legal system .... To base
criticism of the legal order on procedural errors is to risk explaining
injustice as the acts of corrupt, or even just well-intentioned but
confused individuals in positions of authority. It avoids questioning the
order to which the legal system is intricately related. In fact,
Weisberg's reading implicitly legitimizes the legal forms that Vere
claims to uphold, since Vere's actions become illegitimate when they do
not conform to them.
THOMAS, supra note 29, at 212. It is, of course, possible to interpret the story
with a limited holding, the demands of "the rationale of military justice." See
Yoder, supra note 1, at 1116. See also DOLIN, supra note 30, at 128-35. By
contrast, I am suggesting that Melville was more generally focused on legal
relationships and that the sailor and his superiors were simply another
example that fit along a continuum of social dependence.
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decides what is necessary and perilous, or do we have no
choice at sea or in time of war, unlike landsmen)? Or are
the statutes or codes designed to protect dependent seamen
from the abuse of power? Or does the answer lie somewhere
in between? Are larger issues of social order at stake that
supersede any process that Billy is due? Should Billy
understand (as perhaps he does) that he sacrifices his
rights of man when entering this relationship? Is he on
notice?
On the other hand, this is not a relationship Billy
entered voluntarily. Melville's point seems to be that the
relationship of subordination and domination is the
problem. If we believe or feel an injustice took place, we are
simultaneously questioning the nature of the basic legal
relationship that created the predicament or that underlies
the problematic outcome. We are supposed to think that
something is wrong with a legal system that creates or veri-
fies social relationships that elevate hierarchy over justice.
The procedural posture has been manipulated or is called
into question because it is in service of a specific set of legal
relations. Billy is treated according to the conventions of
that relationship. Vere is entitled to use the procedure he
chooses because he is authorized to do so in the legal and
social context of his dominion over Billy.'23 It may be law,
but Vere understands it probably is not justice.
V. CONCLUSION
Men may seem detestable as joint stock-companies and nations;
knaves, fools, and murderers there may be; men may have mean
and meager faces; but man, in the ideal, is so noble and so
sparkling, such a grand and glowing creature, that over any
ignominious blemish in him all his fellows should run to throw
their costliest robes. That immaculate manliness we feel within
ourselves, so far within us, that it remains intact though all the
outer character seem gone; bleeds with keenest anguish at the
undraped spectacle of a valor-ruined man. Nor can piety itself, at
such a shameful sight, completely stifle her upbraidings against
the permitting stars. But this august dignity I treat of, is not the
dignity of kings and robes, but that abounding dignity which has
123. "Thus the reader is left to confront the problem of how the categories of
legal definition help the manipulators of the law uphold their power against
those who might potentially pose a threat to it." WEINER, supra note 33, at 155.
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no robed investiture. Thou shalt see it shining in the arm that
wields a pick or drives a spike; that democratic dignity which, on
all hands, radiates without end from God; Himself! The great God
absolute! The centre and circumference of all democracy! His
omnipresence, our divine equality!
If, then, to meanest mariners, and renegades and castaways, I
shall hereafter ascribe high qualities, though dark; weave round
them tragic graces; if even the most mournful, perchance the most
abased, among them all, shall at times lift himself to the exalted
mounts; if I shall touch that workman's arm with some ethereal
light; if I shall spread a rainbow over his disastrous set of sun;
then against all mortal critics bear me out in it, thou just Spirit of
Equality, which hast spread one royal mantle of humanity over all
my kind! Bear me out in it, thou great democratic God! Who didst
not refuse to the swart convict, Bunyan, the pale, poetic pearl;
Thou who didst clothe with doubly hammered leaves of finest gold,
the stumped and paupered arm of old Cervantes; Thou who didst
pick up Andrew Jackson from the pebbles; who didst hurl him
upon a war-horse; who didst thunder him higher than a throne!
Thou who, in all Thy mighty, earthly marchings, ever cullest Thy
selectest champions from the kingly commons; bear me out in it, 0
God!124
The dignity of man "noble" and "sparkling" drawn from
the "kingly commons" exceeds the "dignity of kings and
robes." The king and his subject is no longer the prevailing
model of political relations in society. Rather, "the arm that
wields a pick or drives a spike" not endowed with "robed
investiture" represents the true royalty, because he "shall
at times lift himself to the exalted mounts." "The meanest
mariners" are elevated by the "just Spirit of Equality, which
hast spread one royal mantle of humanity over all my
kind!" We are all fit to be treated as kings, and so Melville
has demolished the primacy of hierarchy and dependency,
and substituted in its place God's will, equality in a democ-
racy. 
125
124. MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK, supra note 2, at 117.
125. In Billy Budd, Melville "stated explicitly once again that his was a
democratic stage, and affirmed the universality of passion in common men as
well as in kings." MATTHIESSEN, supra note 117, at 500. As evidence of this
sentiment, Matthiessen cites the following passage from the story: " 'Passion,
and passion in its profoundest, is not a thing demanding a palatial stage
whereon to play its part. Down among the groundlings, among the beggars and
rakers of the garbage, profound passion is enacted.' " Id. at 500-01 (quoting
MELVILLE, BILLY BUDD, supra note 98, at 78).
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This then is the touchstone of Melville's view of law, the
interpretive lens through which he filters law as well as
other social artifacts in America. In this passage from Moby
Dick, Melville articulates the heart of his critique of law.
The soul of a democracy, the promise of a democracy, lies in
its commitment to equality. If law, or the rule of law, is to
remain a significant force in a democracy, and not a sham,
it must respect the undeniable democratic impulse of equal
rights. If a legal system, however, replicates or creates a
series of dependent relationships, hierarchies with dispari-
ties in power, then it fails to fulfill its democratic mission.
People should not be treated differently-slaves should not
be in the thrall of owners, workers should be endowed with
as much freedom as employers, sailors should be treated
with dignity and not live in fear. For equality to prevail,
dependency must be eliminated.
Though he wrote them over the course of nearly a half
century, there are striking thematic parallels between
Melville's three stories, Benito Cereno, Bartleby, and Billy
Budd. All three deal with the consequences of hierarchical
relationships and the failure to recognize the distortions in
human relations produced by dependency. Melville seems to
be telling us that these relationships, established or created
in part by legal norms, are not natural. They are also dan-
gerous because they hide reality and prevent us from
attaining equality.
For instance, because Delano is a prisoner of social atti-
tudes that presume hierarchy and dependency, he does not
apprehend that the slaves on board Cereno's ship have
seized their freedom and turned the world upside down.
The slaves understand this, however, and delude Delano
into believing that everything is normal, that the unthink-
able has not occurred. The lawyer in Bartleby has difficulty
coping with the fact that his scrivener will not behave
according to the accepted norms of the employment rela-
tionship. He. slowly begins to perceive that Bartleby, in the
stance of not participating, has seized the upper hand, and
the order in the world again has been inverted. Similarly,
Billy Budd as a common sailor in the thrall of his captain,
asserts his natural dignity in the face of accusations that he
threatened to assault the hierarchy. He pays for it with his
life, but the sailors elevate him in death, knowing full well
that he overcomes the positive law with his martyrdom to
social order and control. In the established "jugglery" of
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things in which the falsely accused are convicted, and those
falsely accusing are dispatched without benefit of law, the
law prefers "measured forms" to the "ragged edges" of
justice.
Melville also suggests that, as a result of the inexorable
operation of the legal relationships, those on the bottom
rung of the hierarchy have no voice or are silenced-an
alarming problem in a democracy. Babo goes to the gallows
in Benito Cereno without his testimony or his story being
heard. He refuses to talk, intuiting that his voice will not be
heard anyway. Bartleby's voice is not understood or listened
to because, in the context of the understandings of the
employment relationship, preferring not to work is not
intelligible. His anguish goes unresolved until he starves to
death. He prefers silence. Billy Budd is affected with a stut-
ter that prevents him from defending himself. Powerless
when accused by officers with rank, he involuntarily strikes
out in the only way he knows with terrible consequences.
Denied a voice, he seeks alternative expression.
The official voices in these stories, as opposed to the
mostly silenced voices, are not truthful or reliable-each
supporting the status quo. There are documents-legal or
official-in Benito Cereno and Billy Budd, and rumors, and
dead letters, as in Bartleby. In each case, the law inter-
venes-to hang Babo and Billy Budd, to imprison Bartleby
and to superintend his death. Benito Cereno's deposition is
only a partial shard of what happened, suggesting that law
at best can only cope with, or be interested in, partial
truths. The official naval account of Billy's acts inverts the
truth; it is not even a partial truth, but a complete lie. In
Billy Budd and Benito Cereno, the official accounts protect
established authority from alternative narratives that
threaten to undermine the accepted legal norms or hierar-
chies. Law's version of the "truth" reinforces hierarchy.
Likewise, all three tales contain a subversive message
about the dangers associated with ignoring the promise of
equality. Some sort of mutiny or revolt by the voiceless or
powerless will occur because the hierarchies cannot be
maintained forever. The hierarchies may be the law, but
they cannot be justice.
In his extraordinary metaphorical meditation in Moby
Dick on the function of law, Melville asked:
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Is it not a saying in everyone's mouth, Possession is half of the
law: that is, regardless of how the thing came into possession? But
often possession is the whole of the law. What are the sinews and
souls of Russian serfs and Republican slaves but Fast-Fish,
whereof possession is the whole of the law? What to the rapacious
landlord is the widow's last mite but a Fast-Fish? What is yonder
undetected villain's marble mansion with a door-plate for a waif;
what is that but a Fast-Fish?
What are the Rights of Man and the Liberties of the World but
Loose-Fish?
126
In Benito Cereno, Bartleby, and Billy Budd, subordi-
nates die for the sin of challenging the hierarchy that
commands them. However, the strategies of subversion of
each of the characters is different: For Babo, it is rebellion;
for Bartleby, passivity and withdrawal; for Billy, loyalty, fi-
delity, and submission. Yet each in the process of dying
asserts a mysterious power over his master, transforming
or haunting him in his own way: Benito's tortured death,
the lawyer's despair, Vere's dying words. In each instance,
the law's role is to set the world on a straightened course;
no reversal of roles is tolerated. The lesson may be that
these tragedies will occur as long as the hierarchies persist
in a democracy. The powerless or subordinate will seek to
demonstrate their power over their masters until they
attain equality. So an ongoing dialectical, perhaps para-
doxical, relationship will exist between powerlessness and
power, law and escape from law. Those silenced may ulti-
mately be empowered by their voicelessness.
It's tempting to reduce the search for meaning in
Melville's work to dualities or dichotomies. To varying
degrees Benito Cereno, Bartleby, and Billy Budd might be
about good versus evil, right versus wrong, guilt versus
innocence, truth versus fiction, history versus fiction, rea-
son versus intuition or emotion, head versus heart, slavery
versus freedom, the universal rights of man and/or natural
law versus positive law, the terror of the French Revolution
versus the formalism of Anglo-American law, natural rights
versus property rights, morality versus law, equality versus
common law, nature versus order, the individual versus the
state, equity versus hierarchy and dependence, and law
126. MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK, supra note 2, at 397, 398.
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versus justice. The list is undoubtedly not exhaustive."7
Nevertheless, part of Melville's strength is that he deals in
universal themes that have been animated by specific
historical contexts. Like Shakespeare, he excels in drawing
out the general from the particular. Virtually everything he
writes about could be analyzed by using some of the catego-
ries suggested in a variety of dual conceptualizations. As in
all dialectical refrains the oppositional categories cannot
exist, indeed make no sense, unless in relationship to each
other. The play between them on all sorts of levels makes
the story. The genius of Melville's art resides in allowing us
as readers to discover in his stories the meanings that most
127. For instance, Carolyn Karcher in analyzing the "critical controversy"
surrounding Billy Budd, describes
Melville himself.., as deeply divided at heart as his critics among
themselves; for the moral dilemma central to Billy Budd-the dilemma
of the Sermon on the Mount versus the Articles of War, justice versus
expediency, freedom and human dignity versus authority, rebellion
versus conformity, social ferment versus despotism, son versus father,
Jobian or Promethean man versus God, is none other than the conflict
Melville had struggled unsuccessfully to resolve throughout his life.
KARCHER, supra note 45, at 294 n.55, 294. Merton Sealts, Jr. adds his own
categories to an analysis of Billy Budd:
[Melville] places Vere as the pivotal point of the dialectic that runs
throughout the story, whether one looks at its characterization-Billy
versus Claggart-or its themes: not only good and evil, but also
innocence and experience, frankness and concealment, nature and
society, barbarism and civilization, heart and head, love and justice,
what is right and what is legal, peacemaking and warmaking, the
Rights-of-Man and the Bellipotent. For Melville and his art, as he
himself acknowledged, such "unlike things must meet and mate."
SEALTS, supra note 15, at 60. For an interesting reading of the natural
law/positive law transformation, see ROBERT FERGUSON, LAW AND LETTERS IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 287-90 (1984).
In evaluating Vere's conduct, the surgeon asks whether or not Vere is
"unhinged" (102). Melville then inquires "who in the rainbow can draw the line
where the violet tint ends and the orange tint begins? Distinctly we see the
difference of the colors, but where exactly does the first blendingly enter into
the other. So with sanity and insanity" (102). As to the truth of sanity versus
insanity, Vere's "degree of aberration, everyone must determine for himself'
(102). Each perception by its very nature "blendingly enter[s] into the other"
(102), defined by its oppositional referent. For an interesting analysis of the
surgeon's role in the story, and the problem of indeterminacy, see Soifer, supra
note 113, at 1955-57. Generally, "the blurring of explicit categories threatens
the definitions imposed by law and calls into question the means by which legal
decisions are reached within each boundary." WEINER, supra note 33, at 155.
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deeply resonate in our experiences. He has something to
say to all of us, even as historians of law.
